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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO
DNA SAMPLING OF ARRESTEES PURSUANT TO THE JUSTICE FOR ALL ACT
OF 2004: A PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO THE TRADITIONAL FOURTH
AMENDMENT TEST OF REASONABLENESS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) is one's genetic "blue print" of life.' It
is unique to every individual in much the same way as a fingerprint is
unique.2 Because of DNA's ability to identify and distinguish among indi-
viduals, many have labeled a DNA profile as a "genetic fingerprint."'3 Like
fingerprints, law enforcement has integrated DNA technology into the
criminal investigation process so that it is now used as a tool for suspect
identification.4 In recognizing the important role DNA plays in solving
crimes accurately and effectively, Congress enacted the DNA Act of 1994,5
which authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to establish a
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to serve as a comprehensive data-
base that stores DNA profiles of convicted offenders from across the na-
tion.6 The CODIS program facilitates an electronic exchange of DNA pro-
files collected from crime scenes and convicted offenders from all fifty
states.7 By comparing DNA evidence collected from crime scenes to DNA
profiles in the database, law enforcement organizations from various parts
of the country can assist each other in solving crimes and locating offend-
ers. 8 Thus far, CODIS has proven to be a powerful law enforcement tool.9
1. Hugh Miller III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH
MATRIX 179, 187-88 (1998) (listing the extraordinary amount of information that may be
revealed through an analysis of one's DNA).
2. David F. Betsch P.h.D., DNA Fingerprinting in Human Health and Society, at
http://www.accessexcellence.org/AB/BA/DNAFingerprintingBasics.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2005).
3. See, e.g., LEXICON EncycloBio, at
http://www.lexicon-biology.com/biology/definition_54.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005)
(defining the analysis of a DNA sequence as "genetic fingerprinting"); Andrea de Gorgey,
The Advent of DNA Databanks: Implications for Information Privacy, 16 AM. J. L. & MED.
381, 381 (1990) (commenting that DNA identification tests have been heralded as the "fin-
gerprint of the future"); Fred W. Drobner, Comment, DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects
of Mass DNA Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 479, 480 (2000) (noting that DNA
profiling is also referred to as "DNA fingerprinting").
4. Betsch, supra note 2.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2004).
6. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The FBI's Combined DNA Index System, Mission
Statement and Background, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited
Feb. 19, 2005).
7. Id.
8. Id. When DNA is obtained at a crime scene, the forensic examiner sends the evi-
dence to the appropriate federal authorities to search for an instantaneous match in the data-
base. United States Dep't of Justice. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The FBI's DNA and DNA
Databasing Initiatives, Oct. 2000, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/tbidna.pdf (last visited
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The amount of time and money the government has invested and plans to
invest in the system demonstrates the degree of confidence the government
has in the CODIS database.'
To capitalize on CODIS's potential, every state has enacted statutes
that require submission of DNA samples from individuals convicted of
qualifying offenses." Each state is responsible for determining the catego-
ries of convicted offenders subject to compulsory DNA sampling.' 2 Since
the implementation of CODIS, the categories of DNA profiles that may be
uploaded into the database have been restricted to only those individuals
actually convicted of qualifying offenses. 13 State database laws, however,
Feb. 19, 2005) [hereinafter DNA Databasing Initiatives]. The following excerpt taken from
the testimony of Dwight E. Adams, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, FBI, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, subcommittee on Crime and Drugs (May 14, 2002), at
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/adams051402.htm illustrates the practical applica-
tion of CODIS:
For example, a DNA profile of a suspected perpetrator is developed from the
sexual assault evidence kit. If there is no suspect in the case or if the suspect's
DNA profile does not match that of the evidence, the laboratory will search the
DNA profile against the Convicted Offender Index. If there is a match in the
Convicted Offender Index, the laboratory will obtain the identity of the sus-
pected perpetrator. If there is no match in the Convicted Offender Index, the
DNA profile is searched against the crime scene DNA profiles contained in the
Forensic Index. If there is a match in the Forensic Index, the laboratory has
linked two or more crimes together and the law enforcement agencies involved
in the cases are able to pool the information obtained on each of the cases.
Matches made by CODIS and confirmed by the participating laboratories are of-
ten referred to as CODIS "hits."
9. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The FBI's Combined DNA Index System, Investiga-
tions Aided, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/aidedmap.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
The FBI measures the success of the CODIS program by counting the number of cases it
helps solve. id. Cases are solved each time COD1S produces "cold hits," which are defined
as DNA matches that provide the police with an investigative lead that would not have been
developed but for the assistance of the database. Id.As of December 2004, CODIS has aided
in the investigation of 20,788 cases. Id.
10. Between 1996 and 2000, Congress allocated $25,000,000 to the FBI to carry out the
goals of the DNA Identification Act of 1994. 42. U.S.C. § 14134 (2004).Between 2001 and
2004, Congress allocated $170,000,000 in grant funding to the states for carrying out the
DNA Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.42 U.S.C. § 141350) (2000).Furthermore, the Justice
for All Act of 2004 creates the Debbie Smith Act of 2004 which authorizes $151 million
each year from FY 2005 through FY 2009. 42 U.S.C. § 141350) (2005).
11. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State
DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R.5th 239 (2004).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 14135(b) (2004) (For a state to be eligible for funding to collect DNA
Attorney General an application in such form and containing such information as the Attor-
ney General may require. The application shall... (3) include a certification that the State
has determined, by statute, rule, or regulation, those offenses under State law that shall be
treated for purposes of this section as qualifying State offenses...") Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (2004) (explaining that while states may collect DNA
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are being expanded each legislative session to include additional categories
of DNA data, such as the DNA profiles of persons merely arrested or in-
dicted for specific offenses. 
14
However beneficial the CODIS database may be to law enforcement,
generating DNA profiles for use in a forensic DNA database results in a loss
of privacy for many individuals.15 As a result, state and federal DNA laws
requiring offenders to submit to DNA sampling have been challenged as
unconstitutional.16 Specifically, some challenge DNA databases as violative
of the Fourth Amendment in so far as compelled DNA sampling on con-
victed offenders amounts to an unreasonable search.' 7
The federal government's most recent legislative effort to improve the
criminal justice system through DNA technology only heightens Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns. 18 On Saturday October 30, 2004, President
samples from a variety of individuals, only "convicted offender" profiles may be uploaded
into CODIS).Smith Ailing Lane is a public services corporation that provides governmental
affairs services to Applied Biosystems, and as part of its service, Smith Ailing Lane gener-
ates reports on federal and state DNA legislation. Smith Ailing Lane, DNA Resource, at
http://www.dnaresource.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).A comprehensive report of state
DNA database laws and qualifying offenses is at
http://www.dnaresource.com/billtrackinglist.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
14. Smith Ailing Lane, DNA Resource, 2004 Legislative Session, DNA Database Ex-
pansion, at http://www.dnaresource.com/2004%20DNA%2OExpansion%20bills.pdf (last
visited Feb. 19, 2005); see also Nat'l Pub. Radio, All Things Considered, Critics Raise Pri-
vacy Concerns over DNA Database (Nov. 16, 2004), at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4173172 (last visited Feb. 19, 2004)
(discussing the recent passage of Proposition 69 which authorizes California law enforce-
ment authorities to collect a DNA sample with a mouth swab from arrestees at the time of
arrest for contribution to California's DNA database).
15. See, e.g., Christine Rosen, Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases, THE NEW
ATLANTIS (Spring 2003), available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/l/rosenprint.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (arguing
that the increasing threat to civil liberties imposed by the existence of DNA databanks out-
weighs any benefit derived from state and federal DNA database laws which provide for
compulsory DNA sampling); Andrew C., Bernasconi, Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA
Threatens Criminal Defendants' Constitutional and Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U.L. REv. 979
(2001) (arguing that the advent of DNA database might violate criminal defendants' statutory
and constitutional rights).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Stegman, 295
F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Md. 2003); Poison v. State, No. CR04-651, 2005 LEXIS 36 (Ark. Jan.
20, 2005); State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003).
17. Id.
18. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Interested Persons Memo Expressing Concerns about
H.R. 3214, the "Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003" (Dec. 16, 2003),
at http://www.aclu.org/Prisons/Prisons.cfm?ID=14614&c=26 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004)
(expressing concern that the expansion of CODIS would result in the inclusion of DNA
profiles from persons convicted of any state crime and if state law allows, from other indi-
viduals' DNA that is included in state databanks).The American Civil Liberties Union
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Bush signed into law H.R. 5107, otherwise known as the Justice for All Act
of 2004.19 The Act expands CODIS to allow for the inclusion of virtually
any DNA information that a state chooses to collect, with two excep-
tions:DNA profiles of arrestees who have not been charged in an indictment
or information, and DNA samples that are voluntarily submitted. 20 The net
effect of such legislation is that states are given grant funding to collect
DNA samples from adults and juveniles arrested and charged with a
crime.2' Some consider the new law to be the "greatest single expansion of
the federal government's power to collect and use DNA" since the CODIS
database was created in 1992.2
Because the Justice for All Act of 2004 has only recently been enacted,
no court has addressed the Fourth Amendment challenge to DNA sampling
pursuant to the Act.23 Nevertheless, the Act raises serious constitutional
concerns. 24 Courts throughout the United States will soon be forced to ad-
dress whether the newly expanded CODIS database infringes constitutional
rights. Specifically, courts will have to decide whether collecting DNA
from individuals merely arrested and charged with a crime is a search, and
if so, whether such a search is reasonable in light of Fourth Amendment
protections.
The following discussion applies traditional Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples to DNA sampling on arrest pursuant to the Justice for All Act of
(ACLU) argues that while federal law "prohibits inclusion of DNA from persons who have
been arrested but not indicted as well as those who voluntarily submit their DNA to be
cleared of a crime, these exceptions do not sufficiently limit the unnecessary expansion of
the database." Id. According to the ACLU, such legislation would ultimately encourage
states to enact laws that require other classes of individuals to submit to DNA testing: "day
care providers, immigrants, people with driver's licenses or even people with a particular
disease." Id.
19. Pub. L. No. 108-405 (2004).
20. Id. at § 203(a)(1).
21. Id. at § 203.
22. See, e.g., Richard Willing, FBI May Collect Juveniles'DNA, USA TODAY, Nov. 17,
2003, at IA.
23. A February 19, 2005 Westlaw search of all federal and state cases containing "Pub.
L. No. 108-405" or "H.R. 5107" produced no cases applying or interpreting the Justice for
All Act of 2004. Two cases exist, however, that mention Pub. L. No. 108-405 as an amend-
ment to the DNA Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2004). In United States v. Cooper the
court noted that the recent amendments to the DNA Act of 2000 did not apply to the case at
hand because the defendant's crime occurred prior to the enactment of the amendments. 396
F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2005). In United States v. Peterson, the court acknowledged the amend-
ments to the DNA Act of 2000, but atl references to 42 U.S.C. § t4135 referred to the pre-
amendment version.394 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2005).
24. See, e.g., John Wildermuth, Proposition to Take DNA at Arrest Stirs Privacy Fears,
S.F. CHRON., June 12, 2004, at Al.
25. See United States v. Kiricade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 (2004) (indicating that the opinion
only construes the DNA Act of 2000 as applied to convicted offenders and not arrestees).
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2004. This note makes no attempt to address every issue associated with
government imposed DNA sampling, but instead, provides a framework for
a Fourth Amendment analysis. Section II provides a background necessary
for an analysis of the Act. This section begins with a survey of federal DNA
database laws, including the most recent legislation, the Justice for All Act
of 2004. Next, this section provides a framework for the Fourth Amendment
analysis. The discussion presents the various methods for collecting DNA
samples and outlines instances in which courts have considered the collec-
tion methods to be searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. To pro-
vide further framework, this section explains the traditional Fourth
Amendment test of reasonableness and offers relevant case law where
courts have considered the reasonableness of DNA sampling under the
DNA Act of 2000. Because no court has addressed the constitutionality of
collecting DNA samples from arrestees, this section discusses an arrestee's
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the interests that are implicated by
DNA sampling. In Section III, this note applies the traditional test of rea-
sonableness to the provisions of the Justice for All Act of 2004 to determine
whether a search of an arrestee's DNA is reasonable in light of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. In Section IV, this
article proposes, however, that the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing
test should be modified to include other factors that bear on the reasonable-
ness of the search of an arrestee's DNA. In this section, this note suggests
that the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test is severely limited in
that it fails to consider whether using the CODIS database to generate leads
for law enforcement is reasonable. After careful consideration of the risks
associated in sampling an arrestee's DNA for use in a database, this note
proposes that there are more interests at stake than the mere physical intru-
sion required for DNA sampling. In spite of these additional considerations,
this note ultimately concludes that there is no Fourth Amendment violation
in DNA sampling of arrestees pursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DNA Databases and Their Legislative Counterparts
DNA databases have existed in one form or another in the United
States for over a decade, although their size and number have increased
greatly in recent years. The following sections examine the history and de-
velopment of the CODIS database that is currently maintained by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
2005]
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1. Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
CODIS, the FBI's Combined DNA Index System, is a law enforcement
tool used to link DNA from an unknown perpetrator to an identifiable sus-
pect.26 It operates much like the national criminal fingerprint database, the
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.27 Like the finger-
print database which catalogues fingerprint profiles, CODIS is essentially a
registry of DNA samples from known individuals organized into a detailed
database with which DNA collected from crime scenes, unidentified human
remains, and crime victims can be compared. 28 Profiles obtained from con-
victed offenders can be linked together with profiles collected from crime
scenes to identify a perpetrator who has left biological evidence at a crime
scene. 29 Any DNA match generated by the database gives law enforcement
probable cause to bring the offender into custody and obtain a confirmatory
DNA sample.3° For these reasons, CODIS serves as an important part of the
investigation process.
2. DNA Identfication Act of 1994
The CODIS program is a direct result of the DNA Identification Act of
1994, which authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to grant
money to states for the development of DNA collection systems. 3' The
DNA Identification Act of 1994, allocates funds to those states that collect,
at a minimum, DNA samples from felony sex offenders and subsequently
organize those samples into their own state database systems. 32 In addition,
26. United States Dep't of Justice. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index
System Program-CODIS (Apr. 2000), at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005) [hereinafter CODIS].
27. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Ailing Lane, P.S., National Forensic DNA Study Report 37 (2003), at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pdf/dna-studyreport-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). This
report was prepared by Smith Ailing Lane in partnership with Washington State University
through the support of a grant awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, United States Dep't of Justice (Grant 2002-LT-BX-K 003). Id. at 2.
28. Id. (citing the July 2002 Special Report from the National Institute of Justice
(Unitee States Dept. of Justice) titled, Using DNA to Solve Cold Cases (NCJ 194197)).
29. Id.As of December 2004, CODIS included DNA profiles from approximately 2
million convicted offenders. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Statistics, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
30. Id. at 38.
31. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 210, 304(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2070 (1994).
32. Pub. L. 104-132, Tihle V II, § 161, Apr. 24, 1996, 11b Stat. 1312, as amended Pub.
L. 106-546, § 6(a), Dec. 19, 2000, 114 Stat. 2733 (requiring that to be eligible for federal
grants, states must "require that each person convicted of a felony of a sexual nature shall
provide to appropriate State law enforcement officials, as designated by the chief executive
officer of the State, a sample of blood, saliva, or other specimen necessary to conduct a DNA
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the DNA Identification Act of 1994 requires each state to link its DNA da-
tabase to the FBI's records in an effort to create one nationwide database 33
Thus, CODIS emerged as the Combined DNA Identification System, oper-
ated by the FBI.
34
Pursuant to the DNA Act of 1994, the CODIS program is organized
into four separate databases, or indexes.35 First, the Convicted Offender
Index contains DNA samples taken from individuals convicted of certain
crimes, no matter if these individuals are currently incarcerated or on super-
vised release.36 Second, the Forensic Index contains DNA profiles generated
from biological material discovered at crime scenes. 37 A third index in-
cludes DNA profiles from unidentified human remains.38 A fourth index
contains DNA profiles of missing persons whose DNA has been voluntarily
contributed to the system by friends and family.39 In addition to the four
statutorily mandated indexes, the FBI maintains a "Population file," which
catalogues anonymous DNA profiles.40 The Population file provides statis-
tical information necessary for determining the probability that DNA sam-
ple picked at random from the population would match a crime scene sam-
ple.4'
To allow state and local agencies more control over the manner in
which DNA profiles enter the CODIS system, CODIS exists in three tiers:
analysis consistent with the standards established for DNA testing by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation").
33. Id. at § 81 1(b)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 1313.
34. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Testimony of Dwight E. Adams, Assistant Director,
Laboratory Division, FBI, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime
and Drugs (May 14, 2002), at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/adams051402.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (stating that the acronym CODIS is used to describe not only the
software used to maintain and run these DNA databases but also "the entire program of soft-
ware support for Federal, state and local forensic laboratories as well as the various indices
(Forensic, Offender and Missing Person) at all three levels-national, state and local.").
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14131-14133 (2004) (authorizing the director of the FBI to "establish
an index of DNA identification records of persons convicted of crimes" as well as indexes of
"analyses of DNA samples recovered from crimes scenes," "recovered from unidentified
human remains," and "voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons.").
36. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (2004).
37. Id. at § 14132(a)(2).
38. Id. at § 14132(a)(3).
39. Id. at § 14132(a)(4)-(5).
40. Stephen J. Niezgoda, Jr. & Barry Brown, Ph.D., The FBI Laboratory's Combined
DNA Index System Program, in Proceedings from the Sixth International Symposium on
Human Identification, (Promega Corp. ed., 1996), at
http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/ussymp6proc/niezgod.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2005). The Population file exists as tool for CODIS developers to analyze the frequency of
certain genetic markers among various populations. Id.
41. Id.
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local, state, and national.42 The first tier, the Local DNA Index System
(LDIS), is the level at which all profiles originate.43 The FBI installs the
LDIS software program at local crime laboratories controlled by sheriffs'
offices or state police agencies.44 Local law enforcement collect DNA sam-
ples from according to state law, and local forensic examiners enter the
DNA profiles into their independent LDIS system.45 To compare profiles
with other LDIS systems within the state, the custodian of the lozal database
will submit its DNA profiles to the state controlled DNA database, for up-
loading in the second tier of CODIS, the State DNA Index System (SDIS).
46
SDIS is maintained by individual state crime laboratories and allows other
laboratories within the state to exchange and compare DNA profiles with
the hope of locating an identifiable suspect.47 To receive federal funding,
the states are then required to contribute DNA profiles of convicted offend-
ers to the third tier of the CODIS system, the National DNA Index System
(NDIS).48 This nationwide database maintained by the FBI allows state fo-
rensic crime laboratories to share and exchange DNA profiles with other
participating forensic laboratories across the country.49
While the FBI provides software and training to state and local labora-
tories that participate in the CODIS database, it is important to remember
that this tiered structure "allows state and local crime labs to operate their
databases according to their specific legislative requirements." 50 In other
words, the FBI might maintain control over the profiles once uploaded in
the NDIS, but the state and local authorities ultimately have control over
which profiles are entered into their respective LDIS and SDIS systems.51
42. DNA Databasing Initiatives, supra note 8. Note that the FBI "provides software,
together with installation, training, and user support free of charge to any state and local law
enforcement labs performing DNA analysis" for use in the CODIS database. Id.
43. Id.
44. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Alling Lane, P.S., supra note 27, at 38.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The SDIS systems are usually controlled and operated by the "agency responsi-
ble for implementing and monitoring compliance with the state's convicted offender statute."
Id.
48. Id.; 42 U.C.S. § 14135(a) (2004).
49. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Ailing Lane, P.S., supra note 27, at 38.
50. CODIS, supra note 26.
51. Id. Note that one consequence of combining these state databases into one is that
CODIS stores DNA profiles taken from individuals who have been convicted of substantially
broader categories of offenses than the qualifying federal offenses enumerated in the DNA
Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d).Indeed, many state programs reach
well beyond the federal model-some collecting information from non-violent drug offend-
ers, and others requiring samples from persons convicted of simple misdemeanors. Examples
include La. Rev. Stat. § 15:602 (2004), Tex. Gov't Code § 411.1471(a)(2) (2004), and Va.
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3. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000
Between 1994 and 1996, no DNA samples were collected from any
persons convicted of federal crimes because the language of the DNA Act
of 1994 authorized only the creation of CODIS and not the collection of
samples from convicted federal offenders. 52 In 1996, as part of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),53 Congress instructed
the FBI to expand CODIS to include DNA profiles from federal offenders.
54
After AEDPA's passage, however, the United States Department of Justice
concluded that AEDPA still did not give federal law enforcement offi-
cials the requisite legal authority to collect DNA samples from federal of-
fenders.55 Consequently, the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000, (DNA Act of 2000), was enacted, and now serves as the statutory
basis for compulsory DNA sampling of federal parolees, probationers, and
56prisoners.
In addition to expanding the CODIS system to include certain federal
offenders, the DNA Act of 2000 also allocated funds to the states to reduce
the backlog of DNA samples that had been collected, but not analyzed.57 As
a result of the nationwide acceptance of the CODIS database, state crime
labs had accrued an enormous backlog of DNA samples that had yet to be
profiled and entered into their state and local databases.58 After finding that
"DNA testing has emerged as the most reliable forensic technique for iden-
tifying criminals when biological material is left at the crime scene," Con-
gress authorized $125 million dollars in federal funding over four years to
help states clear up the backlog of unanalyzed DNA samples.59 In addition,
those states that assured the government that their forensic laboratories
would perform DNA analysis in accordance with nationwide quality proto-
cols as defined by the director of the FBI would be eligible for grant fund-
ing to aid in the collection of new samples.6°
Code Ann. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2004).
52. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. REP No. 106-900 (I), at 8
(2000).
53. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
54. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. REP No. 106-900 (I), at
9 (2000).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 9-10.
58. Nat'l Inst. of Justice, United States Dep't of Justice, NCJ 199425, NIJ Special Re-
port: Report to the Attorney General on Delays in Forensic DNA Analysis 2 (2003), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/199425.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14135(j) (2004); Pub. L. No. 106-561, § 4, Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat.
2791, Findings (1).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 14135(b) (2004),
2005]
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Pursuant to the DNA Act of 2000, certain federal and state offenders
who are currently incarcerated, on parole, probation, or supervised release
are required to provide a DNA sample for inclusion in CODIS.6 1 Offenders
who have been convicted of a federal crime are required to submit a DNA
sample if the crime(s) for which they were convicted includes any of the
violent and sexual offenses enumerated by the DNA Act of 2000.62 For of-
fenders convicted of state offenses, inclusion of their DNA profile in
CODIS depends upon whether the crime for which they were convicted is a
qualifying offense as determined by state law.63 In general, all states partici-
pating in the CODIS system consider violent felony and sex offenses as
qualifying offenses. 64
The DNA Act of 2000 establishes the procedures for collecting DNA
samples from qualifying federal offenders.65 The collection procedures,
however, are vague. The DNA Act of 2000 defines a DNA sample as "a
61. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(l)-( 3) (2004).
62. 42 U.S.C § 14135a(d) (2004). QUALIFYING FEDERAL OFFENSES-() The
offenses that shall be treated for purposes of this section as qualifying Federal offenses are
the following offenses under title 18, United States Code, as determined by the Attorney
General:
(A) Murder (as described in section 1111 of such title), voluntary manslaughter
(as described in section 1112 of such title), or other offense relating to
homicide (as described in chapter 51 of such title, sections 1113, 1114,
1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, and 1121).
(B) An offense relating to sexual abuse (as described in chapter 109A of such
title, sections 2241 through 2245), to sexual exploitation or other abuse of
children (as described in chapter 110 of such title, sections 2251 through
2252), or to transportation for illegal sexual activity (as described in chapter
117 of such title, sections 2421, 2422, 2423, and 2425).
(C) An offense relating to peonage and slavery (as described in chapter 77 of
such title).
(D) Kidnapping (as defined in section 3559(c)(2)(E) of such title).
(E) An offense involving robbery or burglary (as described ill chapter 103 of
such title, sections 2111 through 2114, 2116, and 2118 through 2119).
(F) Any violation of section 1153 involving murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony offense relating to sexual abuse (as described in chapter
109A), incest, arson, burglary, or robbery.
(G) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above offenses.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 14135(b)(3) (2004).
For a State to be eligible to receive a grant under this section, the chief executive
officer of the State shall submit to the Attorney General an application in such
form and containing such information as the Attorney General may require.The
application shall ... (3) include a certification that the State has determined, by
Statute, rxuXe, Or regulat.ioix, khz~oe 1 fzt UwaE State law tha sa b' ftk-e w
purposes of this section as qualifying State offenses.
64. Smith Alling Lane, P.S., DNA Resource, State DNA Database Laws Qualifying
Offenses, at
http://www.dnaresource.com/bill trackinglist.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4) (2004).
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tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an individual on which a DNA analy-
sis can be carried OUt."' 6 6 While the text of the Act does not specify the man-
ner for collecting a DNA sample, FBI guidelines require those in federal
custody and others subject to the DNA Act of 2000 to submit blood samples
for DNA analysis. 67 Those offenders who resist shall can be charged with a
Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year's imprisonment and a
fine of as much as $250,000.68
The DNA Act of 2000 permits the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or
the probation office to contract with units of State or local government or
with private entities to provide for the collection of samples from federal
offenders.6 9 In addition, individuals authorized by the Director to collect the
sample "may use or authorize the use of such means as are reasonably nec-
essary to detain, restrain ... an individual who refuses to cooperate in the
collection of the sample., 70 The following excerpt briefly illustrates how the
collection process works for federal offenders on supervised release who
have at any time been convicted of a qualifying federal offense:
The [probation] officer schedules an appointment for the offender to
meet with the contractor who is responsible for the blood draw. At the
time of the appointment, the [probation] officer accompanies the of-
fender to the site of the blood draw, which may be a health care facility,
or even the probation office. The [probation] officer completes the FBI
form and takes the offender's fingerprints. The contractor then com-
pletes the blood draw and both the [probation] officer and the contractor
sign the FBI form. The FBI-provided kits contain in standardized form
all of the elements needed for a successful blood draw. The [probation]
officer ensures that the form is completed correctly and the appropriate
signatures appear where required. The officer seals the kit and places it
in any mailbox.7 1
At the end of the procedure, the federal offender's blood is turned over
to the FBI for DNA analysis. 72 After generating the DNA profile, the FBI
uploads the profile into CODIS.73
66. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(1).
67. CODIS, supra note 26. Note that because federal law does not establish guidelines
for states to follow when collecting DNA from state offenders, states are free to employ a
wide variety of techniques. See Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington
State University and Smith Ailing Lane, P.S., supra note 27, at 40.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571 & 3581 (2005). Note that the Justice
for All Act of 2004 amended the penalty from $100,000 to $250,000. H.R. 5107, 108th
Cong. § 203 (2004).
69. Id. at § 14135a(a)(4)(B) (2004).
70. Id. at § 14135a(a)(4)(A) (2004).
71. Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Federal Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection, 66
FED. PROBATION 30, 32 (Jun. 2002).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b) (2004).
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Again, federal law does not mandate DNA collection procedures for
state offenders.74 Instead, each state is responsible for determining its own
DNA collection procedures. 75 As of December 2003, over one-half of the
state crime laboratories adopted the federal model by collecting DNA sam-
ples in the form of blood.7 6 The remainder of the states collects DNA in the
form of buccal (cheek) swabs. 7 In addition, some states require DNA to be
obtained in the form of both a blood and buccal swab sample.78
As of August 2004, all fifty states participate in the CODIS database.79
Of the states that participate, thirty-four states collect DNA from all con-
victed felons, thirty-one from juvenile offenders, and twenty-six from those
convicted of misdemeanor offenses. 80 In recent years a few states have ex-
panded their SDIS databases to include DNA profiles from more than just
convicted offenders. Four states-Virginia, Louisiana, Texas, and Califor-
nia-have authorized the collection of DNA from individuals merely ar-
rested and charged for certain crimes. 81 Moreover, many of the New Eng-
land states have introduced legislation which, if enacted, would require a
DNA sample from anyone brought into custody for "fingerprintable ar-
,,82rests.
It is important to remember that the DNA Act of 1994, as originally
enacted, did not allow the CODIS database to accept DNA profiles from
73. Id; see also DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. REP. No. 106-
900(I) at 27 (2000) (indicating that in addition to the DNA profile, the CODIS records con-
tain only an identifier for the agency that provided the DNA sample, a specimen identifica-
tion number, and the name of the personnel associated with the analysis).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4) (2004).
75. Id.
"76. Division of Governmental Studies and Services "Washington State University and
Smith Alling Lane, P.S., supra note 27, at 40.
77. Id. A survey of state crime laboratories indicates that 52.4% collect a blood sample
from offenders while 28.6% of states collect buccal swabs. Id.
78. Id. Nearly one in five states (nineteen percent) collect both types of samples. Id.
79. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Participants, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/partstates.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
80. Lane, supra note 64.
81. Smith Alling Lane, 2004 Forensic DNA Legislative Update and the "Attorney Gen-
eral's Report on the DNA Evidence Backlog, " Presented June 29, 2004 at the Fifth Annual
DNA Grantees Workshop in Washington, D.C., at www.dnaresource.com (last visited Feb.
22, 2005); California voters recently passed the DNA Fingerprint Unsolved Crime and Inno-
cence Protection Act during the November 2, 2004 elections, which requires collection of
DNA samples from all felons, from adults and juveniles arrested for or charged with speci-
fied crimes, and in five years, from adults arrested for or charged with any felony. California
2003-2004 Regular Session, Ballot Measure 19, Proposition 69, California Voter Information
Guide, Proposition 69: Official Title and Summary (Nov. 2004), at
http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop69-title.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
82. Id.
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individuals who had yet to be convicted of a crime.83 Moreover, the lan-
guage of the original DNA Act of 1994 did not permit DNA profiles of ju-
veniles to be uploaded into the CODIS system. 4 Under the original law,
states that participated in the CODIS system were free to upload DNA pro-
files of various classes of individuals in their own LDIS and SDIS data-
bases, but only DNA profiles generated from individuals convicted of state
and federal offenses could be shared with the overarching CODIS data-
base.85 As of October 30, 2004, however, the language of the DNA Act of
1994 was modified to allow for such inclusions.86 The following section
explores the amendments to the DNA Act of 1994.
4. Justice for All Act of 2004 /Debbie Smith Act of 2004
On October 30, 2004, President George Bush signed into law the Jus-
tice for All Act of 2004.87 Title II of the Act enacts the Debbie Smith Act of
2004, which provides over $1 billion over the next five years to the criminal
justice system in order to realize the full potential of DNA technology to
solve crimes and protect the innocent.88 Specifically, the funds will be ap-
plied to eliminate the current backlog of unanalyzed DNA samples in the
nation's crime labs and to improve the capacity of federal, state and local
crime labs to conduct DNA analyses. 89 The bill was introduced into Con-
gress to "protect the innocent and convict the guilty" and to "move our
criminal justice system into a new era of increased fairness and efficiency"
so that no more innocent people are wrongly convicted, or worse, sentenced
to death. 9° To accomplish this goal, the Act (1) provides $755 million to test
the backlog of over 300,000 rape kits and other crime scene evidence that
has yet to be profiled and uploaded into the CODIS database, and (2) au-
83. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (2004).
84. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Ailing Lane, P.S., supra note 27, at 38 (indicating that because most juveniles are
"adjudicated delinquent" rather than "convicted" of a crime, CODIS does not allow for in-
clusion ofjuveniles' DNA profiles).
85. Id.
86. Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004).
87. Id. at § 202.
88. Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004). The Justice for All Act of 2004 incor-
porates the Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act, which was originally intro-
duced to Congress as H.R. 3214/S 1700. 150 Cong. Rec. S11609-01, 108th Cong. (Nov. 19,
2004).
89. Id.
90. Statement of Senator Orin G, Hatch, Chairman, United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Press conference to introduce the "Advancing Justice Through DNA Technol-
ogy Act of 2003" (Oct. 1, 2003) at
http://justice.policy.net/proactive/newsrooni/release.vtml?id=35281 (last visited Feb. 23,
2005).
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thorizes more than $500 million for programs to improve the capacity of
crime labs to conduct DNA analysis, train examiners, support sexual assault
forensic examiner programs, and promote the use of DNA to identify miss-
ing persons.9'
In addition to providing funding to the states for improvement of DNA
technology, Title II of the Justice for All Act of 2004 amends the DNA
Identification Act of 199492 and the DNA Act of 2000.9 3 Specifically, sec-
tion 203 of the embedded Debbie Smith Act of 2004 adds language that
significantly expands the categories of individuals whose DNA may be up-
loaded into the Convicted Offender index of CODIS.9 4 The amendment to
the DNA Identification Act of 1994 modifies the language to allow states to
share DNA profiles of not only those persons convicted of crimes, but also
those persons who have been merely charged with a crime. 95 In addition, the
amendments expand CODIS to include DNA profiles from those individuals
whose DNA could lawfully be obtained and uploaded in LDIS and SDIS
databases according to state law.96 While the Debbie Smith Act of 2004
prohibits inclusion of DNA profiles from persons who voluntarily submit
their DNA or from persons who have been arrested but not charged, the Act
does not exclude DNA profiles from juvenile offenders, misdemeanants, or
others whose DNA has been lawfully obtained by state authorities. 97 Fi-
91. Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2005).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2005).
94. Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004). The relevant portion of
the legislation reads as follows:
42 U.S.C § 14132.Index to facilitate law enforcement exchange of DNA identi-
fication information
(a) Establishment of index. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
may establish an index of--
(1) DNA identification records cf persons zenvicted ef erimesz; of-
(A) persons convicted of crimes;
(B) persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with
a crime; and
(C) other persons whose DNA samples are collected under applicable le-
gal authorities, provided that DNA profiles from arrestees who have not
been charged in an indictment or information with a crime, and DNA sam-
ples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not
be included in the National DNA Index system; and
(2) analyses of DNA samples recovered from crime scenes;
(3) analyses of DNA samples recovered from unidentified human remains; and
(4) analyses of DNA samples voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing
persons.
Note that with the expansion of the categories of DNA profiles that may be uploaded, the
title "Convicted Offender" index becomes a bit misleading.
95. Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. § 203 (2004).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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nally, the Debbie Smith Act of 2004 modifies the DNA Act of 2000 to in-
clude DNA profiles of federal offenders not just convicted of certain quali-
fying felonies, but all felonies.
9 8
Since the Debbie Smith Act of 2004 was first introduced in October of
2003 as part of the Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act,99
there has been steady debate about whether the expansion of CODIS is nec-
98. Id. The relevant portion of the legislation reads as follows:
42 U.S.C § 14135a.Collection and use of DNA identification information from
certain Federal offenders...
(d) Qualifying Federal offenses.
(4) The offenses that shall be treated for purposes of this section as qualify-
ing Federal offenses are the following offenses under title 18, United States
Cede, as determined by the Attorney General:
(A) (1) Any felony Murder (as deser ibed in section 11 11 of such title), vol
unatary mnanslaughter (as descrbed in section 1112 of such tite) or the
offcnsc relatinig to homicide (as deseribed in chapter 51 of such title,see-
tions 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120, and 1121).
(B) (2) Any offense under chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code An
ofenerlatinig to sexual abuse (as described in chapter 1 09A of suceh title,
sections 2211 thfough 2215), to sexual exploitation or othcr abs oef chil
drcn (as described in chapter110 of suc.h title, sections 2251 t 25),
or to trasportation fcr illegl sexuial activity (as deseribed in chapter 117
(C) (3) Any crime of violence (as the term is defined in section 16 of title
18, United States Code) An offense relating to poonago and evo " (as de
seribed in ehapter 77 of such title [18 USCS §§ 1581 et seq.]).
(") (4) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses in para-
graphs (1) through (3) Kidnapping (as defined in section 3559(e)(2)(E) of
such title).
(E An offense involving robbeiy or bufgla-y (as described in chapter 1W3
of such title, sections 2111 through 2114, 2116, and 2118 through 2119).
(F-7) Afy violatien of seetion 1153 involving murder, manslaughter, kidnap
ping,, maiming, a felony off nse relating to sexual abuse (as dee ibed- in
chapter 109A [18 USCS §§ 2211 et seq.]), incest, arson, bur-glary, orrob
be)
(G) A-y atfempt er conspiracoe-ii any of the above-oeffs.s .
(2) in addition to the o-ffcn..ses descr'ibed in paragraph (1), the fllowing offenses shuall be treated fer prae - t fff this qweetion as ul igFdrlo
fcnses, as determined by the Attorney -General:
(B) .Xny crime of violenec (as defined in section 16 of title-18Uie
(C) Any attempt or conspir-acyte omi n oftife above offcnse-,;.
99. The Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act was originally introduced
into Congress as H.R. 3214, but its provisions were later incorporated into the Justice for All
Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, and no longer stands alone as an act. 150 Cong. Rec. S11609-01,
108th Cong. (Nov. 19, 2004).
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essary, or more importantly, whether it is constitutional. 00 The debate be-
gan as a result of the initial draft legislation which contained language per-
mitting the inclusion of DNA profiles from- all persons whose DNA had
been collected lawfully, the only exception being that no DNA obtained on
a voluntary basis would be profiled and included in CODIS.'0 ' Civil liber-
tarians, including members of the ACLU, expressed concern that such an
expansion of CODIS "undermines presumption of innocence and sets a
chilling precedent for data collection by the government of its citizens."'
0 2
By contrast, the National District Attorneys Association encouraged Con-
gress to expand CODIS to mandate the collection of DNA profiles from all
convicted felons, all arrestees, certain juvenile offenders, and individuals
excused from criminal liability as a result of mental illness or disease."
1
'
0 3
After careful consideration, Congress amended the draft legislation but pre-
served the original intent of the drafters, which was to significantly expand
100. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Interested Persons Memo Expressing Concerns about
H.R. 3214, the "Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003," which Includes
the Innocence Protection Act (December 16, 2003), at
http://www.aclu.org/Prisons/Prisons.cfn?ID=14614&c=26 (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) (argu-
ing that proposed legislation that would include in CODIS DNA profiles from persons not
yet convicted of a crime "undermines the presumption of innocence" and any expansion of
CODIS that does so is "unnecessary."); see also Testimony of Peter J. Neufeld, Co-Director
of the Innocence Project, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Ad-
vancing Justice Through the use of Forensic DNA Technology 2003 (July 14, 2003), at
http://justice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=34602 (last visited Feb. 23,
2005)(emphasizing the necessity of "balance between the need for public safety and civil
liberties").
101. Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003, H.R. 3214, 108th Cong.
(2003), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query. The relevant portion of the originally pro-
posed legislation reads as follows:
§ 103. EXPANSION OF COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM.
(a) INCLUSION OF ALL DNA SAMPLES FROM STATES-Section
210304(a)(1) of the DNA Identification Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 14132(a)(1)) is
amended by striking 'of persons convicted of crimes;' and inserting the follow-
ing: of-
(A) persons convicted of crimes; and
(B) other persons whose DNA samples are collected under applicable legal
authorities, provided that DNA profiles from DNA samples that are volun-
tarily submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in the
Combined DNA Index System;
102. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Letter to Senators of the Judiciary Committee Express-
ing Concerns about S. 1700, the "Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003
(June 3, 2004), at
http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/CriminalJustice.cfm?ID=15900&c=15 (last visited Feb.
23, 2005).
103. Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n, Policy Position on DNA Technology and the Criminal
Justice System (July 20, 2003), at
http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/diia_policypositionjuly.20_2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2005).
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the CODIS database to include DNA profiles of "all persons whose DNA
samples have been collected under applicable legal authorities" subject to
few exceptions.' 0 4 The drafters believed the need for expansion was neces-
sary and decided to proceed with expansion in an effort to help solve and
prevent "some of the most serious violent crimes."' 5 Indeed, the current
legislation, as outlined in the Justice for All Act of 2004, authorizes the FBI
to expand CODIS to upload DNA profiles from state and local DNA data-
bases so long as the profiles are lawfully obtained and they do not derive
from arrestees yet to be charged or from individuals who have voluntarily
provided their DNA for elimination purposes.
06
B. Fourth Amendment Considerations
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that all people shall be "secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures ,107 The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Katz v. United
States defines a search to be a government intrusion into an area where one
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 0 8 In other words, when a govern-
ment intrusion goes beyond the physical characteristics exposed to the pub-
lic, a search results and the Fourth Amendment is triggered. 0 9 Since the
decision in Katz, the Court has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment
establishes "rules and presumptions" that limit the government's ability to
intrude upon matters of personal privacy."" 0 These limitations apply to
searches conducted on the inside or outside of a person's body.'1"
The scope of the Fourth Amendment is important for a constitutional
analysis of DNA sampling because DNA exists in one's bodily fluids as
104. H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 2 (2004), at
http://capwiz.com/jp/webreturn/?url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.5107
(last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
105. Id.
106. Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. § 203 (2004). Note that elimi-
nations samples are classified as "DNA records that includes suspects, bystanders at a crime
scene, and anyone else who the police ask to provide a biological specimen." Letter from
Peter J. Neufeld, Innocence Project, Cardozo Law School, to Honorable John M. Leventhal 7
(Feb. 27, 2003) in support of Brief of Amici Curiae, New York Civil Liberties Union and
Cardozo Law School Innocence Project, People v. Rodriguez, 764 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2003).
107. UNITED STATES CONST. amerid. IV.
108. 389 U.S. 347,351-52(t967).
109. Id.
110. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
111. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759-760 (1985) (indicating that the Fourth
Amendment protects an individual's interest against physical intrusions into the body and
such intrusions should be measured against the Katz standard of reasonableness).
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well as in biological material discarded from the body. l" 2 Depending on the
degree of intrusiveness associated with the manner of collecting a DNA
sample, a search into one's protected area of privacy may or may not ex-
ist. 113 Because a Fourth Amendment search analysis ultimately balances the
degree of intrusiveness against an individual's privacy interests, 14 the fol-
lowing sections explore the different methods of DNA collection and the
intrusions they impose. Specifically, the sections will examine how courts
have viewed physically intrusive and nonintrusive methods of collecting
biological samples from individuals within the traditional Fourth Amend-
ment context. In addition, this section considers whether a search results
from the mere analysis of a DNA sample.
1. Whether DNA Sampling Constitutes a Search
To construct the CODIS database, samples of DNA must be collected,
profiled, and catalogued in such a way that it can be accessed efficiently.
The following sections explore how courts view the collection of DNA from
individuals in light of Fourth Amendment.
a. Collecting DNA through intrusive means
An inspection or extraction that penetrates the body or enters its cavi-
ties is regarded as infringing upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and
therefore falls within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.'15 As a result, it
is a search to collect DNA from sources found within the body.16
112. See Victor Walter Weedn & John W. Hicks, Nat'l Inst. of Just., United States Dep't
of Just., The Unrealized Potential of DNA Testing 1-2 (June 1998) at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/170596.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (explaining that be-
cause DNA is found in all cells with a nucleus, it is discoverable in virtually every fluid or
tissue including blood, semen, saliva, skin cells, bone, teeth, tissue, urine, feces, hair, and
other biological specimens).
113. Cf United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696(1983) (subjecting one's luggage to a "dog
sniff' does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because it does not in-
trude on one's legitimate expectation of privacy).
114. See infra Part II.B.2.
115. Winston v.Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767-769 (1966).
116. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that
the "compulsory extraction of blood for DNA profiling unquestionably implicates the right to
personal security embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and thus constitutes a 'search' within
the meaning of the Constitution").
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i. Blood
One possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's bodily flu-
ids by virtue of their not being exposed to the public.' 7 Because DNA ex-
ists in one's blood, a physical intrusion into the body to recover a DNA
sample is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes." 8 The United States
Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California first established that the physical
intrusion necessary to collect a blood sample invades the "integrity of an
individual's person," and therefore constitutes a search." 9 The Court, in
Schmerber, concluded that the involuntary taking of blood from an individ-
ual whom there was probable cause to suspect of drunken driving was both
a seizure and a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 20 The
Court, however, held that due to exigent circumstances, such a warrantless
invasion of the body was reasonable under the facts of the case. Accord-
ing to the Schmerber court, the assertion that the blood testing "procedure
involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain" to most individuals does not
detract from the fact that it necessitates a physical intrusion into the body.1
22
Moreover, the suggestion that such a procedure had become "routine in our
every day lives" does not lessen the value of one's interest his or her bodily
integity. 23 Instead, the Schmerber court emphasized that a Fourth Amend-
ment search results whenever the skin is pierced to collect a blood sam-
ple. 1
24
ii. Saliva and cheek swabs
Swabbing the inside of an individual's mouth with a soft pad to collect
saliva or skin cells is an effective way to collect a DNA sample. 25 When
DNA samples are collected by swabbing the inside of an individual's
117. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.").
118. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821 n.15.
119. 384 U.S at 772.
120. Id. at 767.
121. Id. at 770-71.
122. Id. at 771.
123. Id. at n.13 (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)).
124. Id. at 767 (holding that compulsory administration of a blood test ... plainly in-
volves the broadly co ceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth AKtendrnent.
125. Moses S. Schanfield P.h.D. et al., Abstract, A New Oral Sampling Device for the
Collection of Human DNA: Collection Time, Long Term Storage Studies, and Sample Collec-
tion in Children, Ninth Annual Symposium on Human Identification (1998), available at
http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/ussymp9proc/abstracts/ab45.pdf (last visited Feb.
24, 2005).
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mouth, a search occurs and the Fourth Amendment is triggered. 126 In Henry
v. Ryan, saliva samples were sought from the defendant pursuant to a grand
jury subpoena, and the district court looked to Schmerber as a guide for its
analysis: "While no court has explicitly found that a saliva sample is a
Fourth Amendment search, extracting a saliva sample seems to involve the
same sort of intrusion that goes beyond the physical characteristics exposed
to the public and into the security of the person."' 127 Similarly, the defendant
in United States v. Nicolosi was ordered to provide a saliva sample by hav-
ing the inside of his mouth swabbed with a pad.128 The Nicolosi court ad-
dressed whether the Government must first obtain a search warrant to swab
the inside of the defendant's mouth. 129 Applying Schmerber and Ryan, the
court held that "[s]uch a[n] scenario, wherein a citizen is directed to submit
to an intrusion into his body, is properly viewed as implicating his dignitary
interests.'130 The Nicolosi court ultimately held that "[s]uch a procedure is
clearly a search within the skin, if not literally beneath it.' 3' As a result,
''proper compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment is
mandated."'
132
b. CollectingDNA through non-intrusive means
It is possible to collect a DNA sample through means that do not re-
quire penetration below the skin's surface. 33 One can collect DNA from
126. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers,38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.N.H.
1998) ("A grand jury subpoena compelling a citizen to provide saliva samples does implicate
his or her Fourth Amendment rights."); United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 56
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a saliva sample is "properly deemed a search under the Fourth
Amendment").
127. 775 F. Supp 247, 253 (N.D. 111. 1991). In Ryan, a pad was stuck in the defendant's
mouth to recover the saliva sample. Id.
128. 885 F. Supp 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
129. Id. at 55.
130. Id.;In re Shabazz, 200 F. Supp 2d 578, 582-583 (D.S.C. 2002) (holding that submit-
ting a saliva sample for purposes of DNA testing is a search within meaning of Fourth
Amendment because one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of one's
mouth).
131. Nicolisi, 885 F. Supp at 55. But see In re Nontestimonial Order Directed to R.H.,
762 A.2d 1239, 1244 (Vt. 2000) (indicating that by talking and yawning, the inside of a
person's mouth is exposed to the public view, and as a result, swabbing the inside of the
mouth is a significantly less intrusive means than piercing the skin to draw blood).
132. Nicolosi, 885 F.Supp at 55.
133. Victor Walter Weedn and John W. Hicks, United States Dep't of Justice, Nat'l
Institute of Justice. The Unrealized Potential of DNA Testing 1-2 (1998) at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/170596.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); see also Shaila K.
Dewan, As Police Extend Use of DNA, a Smudge Could Trap a Thief, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2004 (explaining that there is no simple way to avoid leaving DNA evidence at the scene of a
crime because it is present in epidermal cells, and as a result, a new crime lab planned for
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urine, hair, skin cells, and various other biological substances.134 If DNA is
collected through inspection of material on the surface of the body or
through biological material discarded from the body, it is arguable that there
is no search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 135 The following cases
support the claim that no one can assert Fourth Amendment protection of
privacy in biological material that is discarded or exposed to the public.
136
i. Skin scrapings
DNA may also be obtained by "applying a sticky patch to the skin on
an individual's forearm for a moment" to collect epidermal cells that con-
tain DNA. 137 Such a procedure involves no penetration below the skin.
38
Collecting DNA using this method involves merely a cursory inspection of
the outer layer of one's skin, and therefore imposes only a mild intrusion on
one's bodily integrity. 139 The cells are on the outside of the body, where
they are visible to the world in much the same way that fingerprints are ex-
posed to the public. 140 If a DNA profile could successfully be generated
using this procedure, which appears to be no more intrusive than finger-
printing, it is likely a court will find no search in the collection of the
cells. 141 There exists a "constitutional difference between invasive proce-
New York City expects to generate profiles culled from as little as 6 cells' worth of genetic
material collected at the scene of nearly every crime committed in the city, including non-
violent property offenses like home burglaries and auto thefts).
134. Id. at 2.
135. Cf United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973) (holding that a person's
voice is commonly exposed to the public, and because a person has no expectation of privacy
in those physical characteristics which are commonly exposed to the public, there is no
search involved in compelling a defendant to submit to a voice exemplar).
136. Cf California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). The Supreme Court used this
reasoning in Greenwood holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit "the war-
rantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home." The
Court commented that:
[ilt is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snloops, and
other members of the public . . . . Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at
the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collec-
tor, who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted oth-
ers, such as the police, to do so.
137. Ben Quarmby, The Case for National DNA Identification Cards, 2003 DUKE L. &
TECH. REv. 2, 20 (2003) (citing David H. Kaye et al., Is a DNA Identification Database in
Your Future? 16 CRIM. JUST. 4, 9 (Fall 2001)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Kaye et al., supra note 137 (suggesting that the constitutional analysis for the collec-
tion of epidermal cells may be the same as that for fingerprints because both skin cells and
appendages are exposed to the public).
141. Id. at 9-10 (explaining that because the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo v. United
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dures of the body that necessitate penetrating the skin, and an examination
or recording of physical attributes that are generally exposed to public
view."' 142 Skin cells, much like fingerprints, are an identifying feature con-
stantly exposed to the public. 143 As such, "[a]n individual cannot hold the
same expectation of privacy ... that he does for his internal properties."
144
Although no court has addressed whether obtaining skin cells from an area
of the body that is exposed to the public is a search, it is likely that when
confronted with the issue, the court will find there to be no search.
1 45
It is important to note that a different conclusion would result if the
skin cells were collected from an area of the body shielded from public
view. 146 In Cupp v. Murphy, the Supreme Court held that the removal of
skin cells from underneath one's fingernail is a search. 147 In Cupp, the de-
fendant was suspected of strangling his wife to death, and the police sus-
pected that traces of skin, blood, and fabric from the victim would be found
beneath the fingernails of the defendant.148 When the defendant voluntarily
submitted to questioning, the police collected skin scrapings from under the
defendant's fingernails. 149 The Court held that because "the search of the
respondent's fingernails went beyond mere 'physical characteristics . . .
constantly exposed to the public,"' there was a search which warranted a
Fourth Amendment analysis.150
ii. Hair
Hair can be analogized to fingerprints as well. 15' Just as one's finger-
prints are exposed to the public, so is hair. 152 As a result, many courts find
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), is limited to intrusions that invade the privacy of one's home, it
might not constitute a Fourth Amendment search to "take from the surface of a person's skin
cells that are constantly being shed and to analyze the DNA they contain").
142. 345 F.3d 1095,1100 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 354 F.3d
1000 (9th Cir. 2004), en banc, subsequent appeal at United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813
(9th Cir. 2004). Note that while the 2003 Kincade decision was overturned on appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not disagree with the trial court's presentation and analy-
sis of case law on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004).
143. Cf Id.
144. Id.
145. Kaye et al., supra note 137, at 10.
146. Cf Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 292.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 295 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973)).
151. See, e.g., Coddington v. Evanko, 2004 WL 2416429, at *2 (3rd Cir., Oct. 29, 2004)
(concluding that there is no greater expectation of privacy with respect to hair than there is to
fingerprints because both are "subject to public view").
152. Id.
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that collecting hair samples from an individual's scalp or face is not a search
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 53 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills) addressed whether
collecting a hair sample is a search. 154 When the defendant in Mills was
directed by a grand jury to furnish hair samples from his scalp and face to
aid in the investigation of a bank robbery, the court was forced to decide
whether the cutting of hair strands -was "more akin to fingerprinting and
voice and handwriting exemplars which have been held outside the ambit of
Fourth Amendment protection or whether it is more closely aligned with the
extraction of blood samples or fingernail scrapings which have been sub-
jected to Fourth Amendment analysis as to reasonableness."' 5 5 The court
ultimately held that hair, like fingerprints, can be "subject to compelled dis-
closure by the grand jury without implicating the Fourth Amendment.'
156
Again, it is important to remember that the area of the body from
which the hair is collected is important for a Fourth Amendment analysis.
57
If the hair is collected from a private area of the body concealed from public
view, privacy interests are implicated and a search will result. 58 For exam-
ple, in In re Will County Grand Jury, a grand jury subpoenaed pubic hair
samples from the defendant without establishing probable cause. The Illi-
nois court held that "the demand for pubic hair represents a considerable
intrusion into personal privacy and is, without the justification of probable
cause, an indignity to the individual subpoenaed.
1 59
153. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165
(D.N.H., 1998) (holding that grand jury's request for hair samples, like fingerprints, does not
implicate respondents' Fourth Amendment rights); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving
Eve Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a grand jury's subpoena of fin-
gerprints, handwriting exemplars, and hair samples need not be supported by a search war-
rant or a showing of reasonableness).
154. 686 F.2d 135, 139 (3rd Cir. 1982).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 140. Note that the court limited its holding to the sampling of a dead hair
strand: "We need not decide whether the result might be different were the hair root re-
quested, since the hair root, unlike the exposed hair, is a living structure. At times, constitu-
tional distinctions are as thin as a razor's edge." Id.
157. Coddington v. Evanko, 2004 WL 2416429, slip op. at *2 (3rd Cir., Oct. 29, 2004)
(indicating that the difference between sampling hair from the root and sampling from the
surface of the body is "extremely important in a Fourth Amendment context because, while
the exposed portion of hair is above the body surface, on public view and not deserving of
Fourth Amendment protection, the hair root, like blood and fingernail scrapings, is 'below
the body surface .... not on public view' and may well be deserving of such protection."
(quoting Mills, 686 F.2d at 139)).
159. In re Will County Grand 3ury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 936 (111. 1992); see also Bouse v.
Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir.1977) (when police officer unzipped defendant's jail
uniform and forcibly pulled a sample of pubic hair from his person, the resulting intrusion
"was sufficiently severe to constitute a search").
159. Will County, 604 N.E.2d at 936.
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Notwithstanding the degree of intrusion that may or not be imposed
through DNA sampling, it is important to consider whether a subsequent
analysis of one's DNA profile constitutes a search. The following section
addresses precisely this issue.
c. Whether generating a DNA profile is a search
In light of technological advancements, DNA may soon be extracted
with virtually no bodily intrusion 160 If the government could obtain one's
DNA without intrusion upon one's bodily integrity, then under the reason-
ing of prior court precedent, arguably no Fourth Amendment search would
exist. 6 1 Yet, even if a bodily intrusion is not required to obtain the sample,
extensive chemical analysis is needed for the identifying features of DNA to
be evident. 162 Whether the subsequent chemical analysis reveals information
in which one maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy ultimately de-
termines whether the subsequent analysis constitutes a search.1
63
The first case to address whether chemical analysis of one's biological
material constitutes a search is Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Asso-
ciation. 64 In Skinner, the United States Supreme Court upheld federal regu-
lations which required railroad officials to collect breath and urine samples
from employees involved in railway accidents for drug and alcohol test-
ing.' 65 The Court recognized that unlike the blood testing procedure in
Schmerber, the procedures employed by the railway organization to collect
the biological samples did not necessitate a physical intrusion into the
body. 166 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the subsequent chemicalanalysis of the sample "to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of
160. See, e.g., Roland A.H. von Oorschot & M.K. Jones, DNA Fingerprints from Finger-
prints, 387 NATURE 767 (1997), available at
http://www.nature.com/cgitaf/DynaPage.taffile=/nature/journal/v387/n6635/abs/387767a
fs.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (describing techniques for obtaining DNA by amplifying
oil skin deposited by making a fingerprint).
161. Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp 1048 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (suggesting cheek
swabs could be held to be more like fingerprints and may not even constitute a search given
the minimal nature of the intrusion that a cheek swab entails).
162. Nat'l Comm. on the Future of DNA Evidence, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, United States
Dep't of Justice, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing:Predictions of the Research and De-
velopment Working Group 17-20, Nov. 2000, at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
163. See Quarmby, supra note 137 (indicating that the ultimate consideration in deter-
mining whether removal or inspection of bodily material constitutes a search is the nature of
the information that can be derived from DNA data).
164. 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
165. Id. at 613.
166. Id. at 617.
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the tested employee's privacy interests. '1 67 The Court emphasized that
chemical analysis of a urine sample "can reveal a host of private medical
facts about an employee," and "a breathalyzer test ...implicates similar
concerns about bodily integrity." 168 As a result, even though no physical
intrusion was involved in collecting biological material from the railway
employees, the subsequent chemical analysis constituted a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.1
69
Skinner stands for the proposition that an analysis of biological mate-
rial that reveals no private information would not qualify as a search for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 170 Applying the reasoning of Skinner, it
is no surprise that the process of collecting and analyzing fingerprints does
not amount to a search. 171 In Davis v. Mississippi, the Court held that the
process of obtaining a fingerprint is not subject to the Fourth Amendment
because it "involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and
thoughts that marks an interrogation or search."'' 72 Unlike the urinalysis
employed in Skinner, a fingerprint reveals no private information, but in-
stead exists solely for identification purposes. 173 The Indiana Supreme Court
in Palmer v. State explained that because "fingerprints are an identifying
factor readily available to the world at large," the process of obtaining a
fingerprint is "not the type of intrusion, regardless of its use as evidence or
for identification purposes, protected by the Constitution."' 174 Under Su-
preme Court precedent, it appears that if a DNA profile contains only
unique identifiers, like a fingerprint, it is arguable that no Fourth Amend-
ment search results from the analysis of one's DNA profile. 75 This is so
167. Id. at 616.
168. Id.at 616-17.
169. Id. at 617.
170. 489 U.S. at 617.
171. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (applying Davis to hold that "finger-
printing, because it involves neither repeated harassment nor any of the probing into private
life and thoughts that often marks interrogation and search" does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search while the actual detention for purposes of obtaining the fingerprints is
subject to the Fourth Amendment); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1968) (indicat-
ing that while the actual process of obtaining fingerprints is not a search, detaining an indi-
vidual for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment).
172. 394 U.S at 727.
173. Id.
174. 679 N.E.2d 887 (nd. 1997) (holding that the warrantless acquisition of defendant's
fingerprints during his trial did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search).
t75. State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d t3 t,145 (Raw. 2003) (holding that no privacy interest exists
in either a DNA sample or profile, and as a result, uploading the defendant's DNA profile
into the state convicted offender DNA database does not amount to a search); Bickley v.
State, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. App. 1997) (indicating that DNA profiles are like finger-
prints which are maintained on file by law enforcement authorities for use in further investi-
gations; consequently, sharing the DNA evidence between law enforcement in the state data-
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because the Court does not consider one to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in one's identity.'76
2. Whether a Warrantless Search of an Arrestee's DNA is Reason-
able
Whether DNA sampling amounts to a search is only a part of the tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment analysis. 77 The second half of the analysis is to
determine whether such a search is reasonable. 178 The reasonableness of a
search depends on governmental compliance with the Warrant Clause,
which requires authorities to demonstrate probable cause to a neutral magis-
trate before proceeding with a search. 179 In general, if no warrant is ob-
tained, then any subsequent search is per se unreasonable and in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 80 The United States Supreme Court, however, has
created an exception whereby law enforcement officers may lawfully con-
duct a search without a warrant, without probable cause, and without indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion: A search is not per se unreasonable if the
government's interest in conducting the search outweighs the degree of in-
trusion upon an individual's privacy. 18' Consequently, the government
needs neither a warrant nor individualized suspicion to conduct a search
when the balance of interests weighs in the government's favor. 82 Applying
this balancing test, the Court has condoned several instances in which the
government may constitutionally conduct warrantless and suspicionless
searches. 83 Whether DNA sampling falls into one of the carved exceptions
base did not require a second search warrant).
176. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (holding that a police officer is
free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment, for inter-
rogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by
itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment search or seizure).
177. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004).
178. Id. at 822; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
(noting that the "Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only
those that are unreasonable"). Generally, the reasonableness of a search is judged by balanc-
ing the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment rights against the strength of the
government's interest in pursuing the search. Id.
179. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822 (citing United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S.
297, 315-16 (1972)).
180. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
181. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
182. Id.
183. First, the Court permits suspicionless searches at the United States border, in pris-
ons, and in airports and government buildings.; Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)
(accepting that suspicionless searches conducted at "airports and at entrances to courts and
other official buildings" do not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the substantial threat to
public safety at these locations"); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1983) (indicating
that the "Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply
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to the warrant requirement, however, is beyond the scope of this discussion.
Instead, the following discussion presents the traditional Fourth Amendment
test of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which a
search of an arrestee's DNA intrudes upon his or her privacy, and on the
other hand, the degree to which DNA sampling is necessary for the promo-
tion of legitimate governmental interests.184 The following sections address
the interests implicated when the government collects DNA in the form of a
blood sample from individuals arrested and charged with a crime.Part (a)
considers the government's need in collecting DNA samples from individu-
als arrested and charged with a crime, and (b) considers the privacy interests
implicated when the government includes DNA profiles from individuals
who have yet to be convicted of a crime into its national DNA database,
CODIS.
a. Government's interests in DNA sampling
The government unquestionably has a strong interest in developing and
maintaining a database of DNA samples.'85 This interest is due in no small
part to the critical role DNA databases play in the criminal justice system. 186
The following sections explore the government's interest in identifying sus-
pects, exonerating the innocent, and preventing recidivist offenders from
committing new crimes. Finally, this section concludes with a brief explana-
tion of how CODIS promotes efficacy within the criminal justice system.
within the confines of the prison cell"); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)
(holding that suspicionless searches made at the border are reasonable in light of the gov-
ernment's need to protect itself from individuals "crossing into this country"). Second, the
Court permits suspicionless governmental intrusions that are deemed to be "administrative"
in nature. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) ("We have also allowed
searches for certain administrative purposes without particularized suspicion of miscon-
duct"); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (indicating that administrative
searches are conducted for the purpose of inspecting businesses and industries for compli-
ance with safety and regulatory standards).Third, the Court created the "special needs" ex-
ception to permit suspicionless searches that are conducted as part of a government spon-
sored program that is designed to serve "special needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 36 (invalidating roadside checkpoint program designed to
discover illegal drug trafficking); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002)
(where students submitted to compulsory urine testing to prevent health and safety risks from
drug use and "the test results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority" there is
no Fourth Amendment violation).
184. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; see also Wyo. v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Verno-
nia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
185. See Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. REP No. 108-711 at 2 (2004).
186. Id.
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i. Identifying suspects
An important contribution of the CODIS system is that it allows DNA
evidence recovered from a crime scene to be linked to an identifiable perpe-
trator.187 The new and powerful CODIS database helps solve crimes that
have remained unsolved for decades. 8 8 As of December 2003, there were
542,700 unsolved homicide, rape, and property cases with possible biologi-
cal evidence either in the possession of local law enforcement or back-
logged in a state forensic database. 89 Using the CODIS database, this bio-
logical evidence will ultimately be converted into a DNA profile and com-
pared with the convicted offender index to search for a match in the hope of
identifying a suspect. 190 The DNA profile from the crime scene is run
against the 93,956 DNA profiles from other crime scenes in the forensic
index to see if other crimes may be linked together.1 91 Any "hits" lead to
notification of the appropriate law enforcement agencies so that they may
share their information. 192 As of December 2004, CODIS has produced over
19,000 hits assisting in more than 20,700 investigations forty-seven
states. 193 The "hits" resulting from a match in CODIS identify approxi-
mately one offender for every 1,000 samples contained in CODIS. 94 These
statistics demonstrate the degree to which the CODIS system streamlines
the criminal justice system in the investigative process by identifying a sus-
pect almost immediately.
195
187. CODIS, supra note 26; see also Christina Lewis, COURTTV, Solving the Cold Case:
Time, DNA and Ingenuity Can Help, at
http://www.courttv.com/news/hiddentraces/sidebars/successstories.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2005) (offering a survey of "cold cases" that have been solved using the CODIS system).
188. Id.
189. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Alling Lane, P.S, supra note 27, at 3.
190. As of December 2004, there were 2,038,470 convicted offender profiles with which
to compare the evidence. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Statistics, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
191. Id.
192. CODIS, supra note 26. The Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services offers
a succinct definition of a database hit: "A hit occurs when DNA analysis of a crime scene
sample with no suspect matches a profile in a database of previously convicted offenders, a
database of samples from those individuals arrested for specified crimes, or a database of
other crime scene profiles." at
http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/forensic/information/dna.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
193. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Investigations Aided, at
http.Iw-.%i.go-v hqlfabi/odisfaidtdmap.htm (Xas visitd Feb. 27, 2WQS).
194. Christopher H. Asplen, From Crime Scene to Court Room: Integrating DNA Tech-
nology into the Criminal Justice System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 147 (1999). According to Mr.
Asplen, the Executive Director of the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence,
some states experience even a higher hit rate. Id.
195. Logic dictates that the FBI only achieves such great results from the CODIS system
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Perhaps the most effective demonstration of the government's interest
in DNA sampling can be seen through a portrayal of the real life experi-
ences of those whose lives have been changed as a result of a DNA match
generated by the CODIS database. The following sections offer case studies
that illustrate CODIS's ability to identify the guilty and exonerate the inno-
cent. To begin, the following excerpt shows the powerful sense of closure
and relief that a DNA match can bring to a victim of violent crime:
On a Friday afternoon in March 1989, Debbie Smith was abducted from
her home by a man she had never seen before. Mrs. Smith's assailant
forced her from her kitchen to the woods behind her home and rapes her.
Before leaving the scene of the crime, the rapist threatened Mrs. Smith,
saying he knew where she lived and he would kill her if she ever told
anyone what had happened. The local police department developed a
suspect in the case, and sent a sample of his blood, along with the evi-
dence, to their forensic crime laboratory. Five years later, in 1994, the
county where Debbie resided experienced an outbreak of sexual assault
and rape crimes. The police developed a suspect in this case, and sent a
sample of his blood to the laboratory. The police also resubmitted the
evidence from Debbie Smith's case, thinking the same subject may be
responsible. This time, the laboratory performed DNA analysis. Again,
the suspect was excluded. But now, the laboratory had developed a
DNA profile of the man who raped Mrs. Smith. When processed
through the recently implemented Virginia DNA databank, the DNA
sample of her assailant collected years earlier was matched with a DNA
profile of an inmate in a Virginia prison who was currently serving a
161 year sentence. When informed that the man who raped her had been
identified, Debbie Smith said, "I feel like a weight has been lifted from
my shoulders."' 19
6
This is a compelling story, and there are many others just as compel-
ling.197 Debbie Smith's success story and others like it are a direct result of
when participating state and federal forensic laboratories actually upload DNA profiles into
the CODIS database. A recent investigation into the Denver Police Department reveals that a
DNA sample that might have identified an alleged serial rapist was not matched to the sus-
pect because his DNA profile was never uploaded to CODIS.Sean Callebs, Police Admit
Computer Mix-up in Serial Rape Case, Cnn.com (Feb. 21, 2005), at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/21/colorado.rapes/index.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). While the error has been determined to be a result of a "computer glitch," a news
report indicates that the error occurred when an FBI contractor attempted to transfer data to a
new computer server. Id. Not only did the serial rapist's DNA profile not get uploaded, but
neither did many other DNA profiles. Id.
196. Niezgoda & Brown, supra note 40. Note portions of this story have been deleted
from the original material.
197. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Science and Technology in the Name of Justice Part 2,
FBI DNA Database Passes an Important Milestone, Recent CODIS Success Stories, at
http://www.fbi.gov/success.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2004); see also United States Dep't of
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the nationwide acceptance of the CODIS system. 198 After all, the CODIS
database is most effective as a crime fighting tool if each state contributes
offender profiles.' 99 The more samples in the database with which to com-
200pare, the faster law enforcement can identify a perpetrator.
ii. Exonerating the innocent
By the same token, the government also has an interest in preventing
and correcting erroneous convictions. 2 1 A DNA hit generated from the
CODIS database can be used to clear suspects and exonerate persons mis-
takenly accused or convicted of crimes.202 The following excerpt tells the
story of Ronald Cotton, who was exonerated by a CODIS match after serv-
ing over ten years in prison:
Ronald Cotton was accused of raping two women during the summer of
1984. Both victims were taken to the hospital, where full rape examina-
tion kits were completed. The first victim, 22-year-old Jennifer Thomp-
son, described her attacker as a tall African-American man in his early
20s. Police collected photographs of area men meeting that description,
including 22-year-old Ronald Cotton. Thompson selected Cotton from
police photos as her rapist. At a physical lineup of suspects, Thompson
again selected Cotton. In August 1984, police arrested Cotton and took
him into custody. In January 1985, Cotton was convicted of Thompson's
rape and sentenced to life in prison. That verdict, however, was over-
turned, and a new trial was ordered. Cotton was optimistic given a cru-
cial discovery he had made about one of his fellow inmates, Bobby
Poole-a tall African-American young man also convicted of rape who
bore a strong resemblance to the composite sketch used in Cotton's case.
Poole had reportedly bragged to inmates that he had committed the rapes
for which Cotton was serving time. At Cotton's second trial, both vic-
Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The FBI's Combined DNA Index System-CODIS,
supra note 26.
198. See Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. No. 108-711 at 2 (Sept. 30, 2004).
199. WashingtonPost.com, Inside the FBI: Forensic Science Technology With John
Behun Unit Chief for Combined DNA Integration System (CODIS), (May 6, 2003), at
http://discuss.washingtonpost.con/wp-srv/zforum/03/rnation fbi050603.htm (CODIS re-
ceives 45,000 to 50,000 new DNA profiles each month.) Id.
200. Id.; see also John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposalfor
Complete DNA Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 134 (2000) (indicating that "the effec-
tiveness of the federal databank rests on the size of the linked state databanks.").
20 1. See Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. REP No. 108-711 at 3 (Sept. 30, 2004).
202. Id. at 2. Note that arrestees benefit from the CODIS database because "In about 25%
of the cases submitted to the FBI lab during the past decade, the crime scene DNqA does rot
match the DNA of the suspect. In other words, hundreds of arrested persons are exonerated
before trial each year by DNA test results." Innocence Project, DNA News, Post Arrest DNA
Exonerations, at http://www.innocenceproject.com/dnanews/index.php (last visited Feb. 27,
2005).
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tims testified against him, the jury did not believe that Poole was the real
assailant, and the court withheld evidence of Poole's alleged confes-
sions. Convicted of both rapes, Cotton received two life sentences plus
55 years in prison. In 1994 Cotton learned about DNA testing (a proce-
dure unavailable at the time of his trials). He filed and won a motion for
DNA testing. The state DNA database matched the DNA samples taken
from the victims to Bobby Poole. On June 30, 1995, almost 11 years af-
ter the rapes and 10 1/2 years after being taken into custody, Ronald
Cotton was cleared of all charges and released from prison.
20 3
DNA has the power to exonerate others like Ronald Cotton already
serving time for a crime they did not commit. 20 4 More than 230 wrongfully
convicted and imprisoned individuals have been exonerated and released
from prison, 130 of which were exonerated by DNA evidence.20 5 These
statistics demonstrate that DNA evidence in general, and CODIS in particu-
lar, can be powerful tools to protect the innocent. Undoubtedly, the criminal
justice system, if not the government itself, has an overwhelming interest in
just convictions.
iii. Stopping recidivists
As a result of CODIS's success in identifying perpetrators and exoner-
ating the innocent, the National Institute of Justice commissioned an inde-
pendent study20 6 to determine exactly how powerful CODIS could be as a
law enforcement tool.20 7 As part of its charge, the commission conducted
case studies on crimes that would have been prevented if CODIS had been
203. United States Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Kathryn M. Turman,
Understanding DNA Evidence: A Guide for Victim Service Providers (Apr. 2001) at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/dna 4_2001/dnal 1 4_01.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
204. Id.
205. Frontline, Burden of Innocence, May 1, 2003, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/burden/etc/faqsreal.html#2 (last visited Feb.
27, 2005); see generally Innocence Project, at www.innocenceproject.org. This organization
is a non-profit legal clinic that only handles cases where post-conviction DNA testing of
evidence can yield conclusive proof of innocence. Id. The website maintains a running total
of all exonerations accomplished through DNA testing. Id.
206. The study was conducted by Smith Ailing Lane and Washington State University
and was presented to the National Institute of Justice on Dec. 12, 2003, as the National Fo-
rensic DNA Study Report. The report is at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pdf/dna-studyreport-final.pdf. The study indicates that more
than 165 serious crimes, including at least 116 rapes and 22 murders could have been pre-
vented if every state had begin taking DNA samples from all convicted felons in 1990. Id.
207. United States Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Institute of Justice, DNA Backlog Reduction
Program Case Studies of Preventable Crimes, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/sciencetech/dnaprevent/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2005).
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implemented at the time the suspect was originally brought into custody.2 °8
One of the case studies offers the story of how four rapes could have been
prevented in Arkansas with the assistance of CODIS:
Between 1995 and 1997, seven rapes were committed against women
and young girls across four counties in Arkansas. In at least four of the
cases, the victims were assaulted after being stopped by a man posing as
a police officer, whom newspapers subsequently dubbed the "Blue Light
Rapist." In 1997, a suspect was identified as the suspected rapist through
the assistance of one of his acquaintances who was working with law en-
forcement. Subsequent DNA testing linked him to several of the rapes,
with other evidence and victim descriptions tying in the remaining cases.
The suspect had been convicted in 1996 on charges of theft by receiving
a stolen rifle.
20 9
Had the blue light rapist's DNA sample been entered into the CODIS
system upon arrest in 1996 for the theft offense, up to five of the subsequent
rapes could have been prevented. 210 The police would have had the sus-
pect's DNA profile on file in the CODIS database in 1996, and as a result.
they would have been able to identify him using the crime scene evidence
collected from the first victim.
211
It is precisely such repeat offenders, like the blue-light rapist, that the
CODIS database is designed to identify and prevent from committing addi-
tional offenses.2 12 A recent study on recidivism found that 67.5% of re-
leased prisoners were re-arrested and charged with a new offense within
213three years of their release. CODIS targets these repeat offenders by hav-ing their genetic identity permanently included in the database for future
208. Id.
209. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Ailing Lane, P.S, supra note 27, at 50.
210. Cf id. Note that this Report offers case studies of crimes that could have been pre-
vented if the repeat offender's DNA profile had been uploaded into the CODIS system at the
time of his or her first conviction. Whether the DNA was obtained from the offender upon
arrest or first conviction, however, leads to the same conclusion: The blue light rapist's DNA
profile would have been obtained at an early stage that would have enabled law enforcement
to identify him by name thereby preventing him from committing additional rapes.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 47.
213. Patrick A. Langan & David D. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994,
Special Report, Washington D.C. United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Statistics, Jan.
2002, NC 11191:1. This study tracked 272,111 released prisoners from 15 states. The
study found that 29.9% of the released prisoners were rearrested for a new offense within six
months of release. The study also found the offenders accounted for 4.1 million arrest
charges prior to their most recent incarceration and were responsible for another 744,000
arrest charges within three years of release. Id.
[Vol. 27
DNA SAMPLING OF ARRESTEES
comparison with DNA left at crimes scenes.2 14 CODIS's ability to identify
recidivist offenders furthers the government's interest in crime prevention.
iv. Principles of efficacy
Limiting the CODIS database to include only those individuals actu-
ally convicted of an offense impedes CODIS's ability to identify perpetra-
tors.21 5 A recent study indicates that sixty-six percent of all individuals ar-
rested and charged with a crime have a prior arrest record while only thirty-
eight percent of them have at least one prior felony conviction.1 6 Under the
original provisions of the DNA Act of 1994, only the DNA profiles from
those thirty-eight percent who have a prior conviction would make up
CODIS's searchable data.21 7 Given this structure, the database is of no help
in investigating crimes committed by persons not previously convicted of an
offense. Because the majority of individuals ultimately arrested and charged
have no prior conviction, it appears that CODIS would be more effective as
an investigative tool if it were expanded to include DNA profiles from indi-
viduals arrested and charged with a crime.218 Ultimately, if DNA profiles
are collected from individuals upon arrest, CODIS will provide "investiga-
tors with the tools they need to identify a suspect and remove the threat to
public safety before the same perpetrator can re-offend.
' 21 9
214. Cf. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University
and Smith Ailing Lane, P.S, supra note 27, at 47.Again, note that this report offers case
studies of crimes that could have been prevented if the repeat offender's DNA profile had
been uploaded into the CODIS system at the time of his or her first conviction. Nevertheless,
whether the DNA was obtained from the offender upon arrest or first conviction leads to the
same conclusion: Law enforcement would be able to identify the repeat offender using DNA
evidence collected from the first crime scene thereby preventing the commission of addi-
tional crimes.
215. D.H. Kaye, DNA identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for
Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WiS. L. REv. 413, 451 (2003).
216. Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large Urban
Counties, 1994, Executive Summary, at 2 (1998) (indicating that more than half of felony
defendants have prior felony records while at least two-thirds of all defendants have a prior
arrest record).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (2004). This is so because the original DNA Act of 1994
limited the CODIS database to include DNA profiles to only convicted offenders. Id. Note
that the Justice for All Act of 2004 amended the provisions to include DNA profiles from
individuals arrested and charged with an offense. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(B) (2005).
218. Kaye, supra note 215, at 451. Note, however, that in his article, Kaye argues for a
comprehensive DNA database which would include DNA profiles from all individuals. Id. at
459. Kaye highlights that of those defendants prosecuted for serious felonies, at least one-
third have no prior arrest record. Therefore, Kaye argues that to be truly effective, the data-
base should be transformed to a population-wide database. Id. at 460.
219. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Alling Lane, P.S, supra note 27, at 47.
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Perhaps the best proof that CODIS would be more effective if it was
expanded to include DNA profiles from arrestees can be illustrated through
the success of United Kingdom's database. In the United Kingdom, police
take DNA profiles from all persons arrested for imprisonable offenses and
upload them into its DNA database. 220 As of March 2003, the U.K. reported
to be experiencing a forty percent hit rate.221 In other words, four out of ten
new crime scene samples checked against the database will match a previ-
ously recorded profile of an offender or suspect.222 In addition, the U.K.
reports that in one month, the database typically links suspects to fifteen
murders, thirty-one rapes and 770 motor vehicle, property and drug
223crimes. Given these statistics, it is clear that CODIS's ability to solve
crimes could be greatly enhanced if the database were expanded to include
profiles of arrestees charged with a crime.
It is important to note, however, that a CODIS hit does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the identified suspect committed the crime or
even personally left the DNA evidence.224 However, a CODIS match inevi-
tably provides the prosecution with a stronger case.225 Strong DNA evi-
220. Joshua Rozenberg, Police Allowed to Keep DNA of Innocent People,
News.telegraph (July 23, 2004) at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (offering the story of how a court in
the U.K. ruled that police may lawfully obtain a DNA sample from anyone arrested for an
imprisonable offense and permanently retain the sample for inclusion in the U.K.'s DNA
database, even if the arrestee is never charged with a crime); see also Criminal Justice Act of
2003, 2003 Ch. 44 Part 1 § 10 (2003) at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030044.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (formally
amends U.K. law to allow for inclusion of arrestee DNA samples in its database).
221. Forensic Sci. Serv. Comm. Dep't. The National DNA Database Annual Report
2002-2003 at 3, at
http://www.forensic.gov.uk/foreisic/news/press-releases/2003/NDNAD-Annual-Report-02
-03.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
222. Id.
223. Forensic Science Serv. Comm. Dep't. Press Release: National DNA Database An-
nual Report 2002-2003, at
http://www.forensic.gov.uk/foreisict/inside/news/listpressrelease.php?case = 1 6&y=2003
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
224. Samuel Lindsey et al., Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS J.
147,148 (2003) (explaining that "DNA analysis, by itself, can establish only that someone
could be the source of a genetic evidentiary sample. Whether that person is in fact the source
depends on the integrity of the analysis, the rarity of the DNA profile in question, and any
other evidence implying that the suspect is or is not the source of the evidence.") For exam-
ple, a DNA profile from an unknown suspect in a rape case could match with the victim's
boyfriend, assuming that the boyfriend had a prior offense which resulted in his DNA being
entered into the CODIS database. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washing-
ton State University and Lane, supra note 27, at 41. If the victim is certain that her boyfriend
was not the rapist, then the "hit" is not valuable to the investigation. Id.
225. Division of Governmetital Studies and Services Washingtorl State University and
Lane, supra note 27, at 41.
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dence is difficult to refute, and when defendants are confronted with a posi-
tive DNA match linking them to the crime scene, the likely result is an in-
crease in guilty pleas. 2 6 Guilty pleas undoubtedly save the state and federal
court systems time and money.227 Even in cases involving pleas of not
guilty, the availability of the CODIS database aids the criminal justice sys-
tem by providing a reliable source of evidence. 28 DNA evidence is more
reliable than eyewitness testimony in that it can place a defendant at the
crime scene.22 9 As a result, DNA evidence is frequently used in court as a
substitute to eyewitness testimony, which has been proven to be misleading,
230or even false, at times.
Although collecting DNA profiles from individuals arrested and
charged with crimes may seem to promote efficacy within the criminal jus-
tice system and aid law enforcement efforts in crime prevention, one must
not forget that the Fourth Amendment requires a balancing test before the
government may conduct searches on individuals, including arrestees. An
arrestee has privacy rights, and as a result, when examining the constitu-
tionality of the Justice for All Act of 2004, the government's overwhelming
interest in collecting DNA from arrestees must be balanced against the ar-
restee's privacy right in his or her DNA profile.
b. Privacy rights of arrestees
DNA sampling pursuant to the Justice for All Act implicates the ar-
restee's interest in bodily integrity in so far as it authorizes a physical intru-
sion into the body.23' It is firmly established, however, that the "intrusion
occasioned by a blood test is not significant," because for most people "the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain., 232 In fact, the United
226. Stephanie A. Parks, Compelled DNA Testing in Rape Cases: Illustrating the Neces-
sity of an Exception to the Self-Incrimination Clause, 7 WM. & MARY. J. WOMEN & L. 499,
510(2001).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Nat'l Comm. on the Future of DNA Evidence, National Institute of Justice, What
Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence (Sept. 1999), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/nij/DNAbro/what.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (noting that a DNA
match proves with near certainty that a person was at a crime scene).
230. Nat'l Inst. of Justice, United States Dep't of Justice, NCJ 161258, Convicted by
Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Inno-
cence After Trial 15-17 (1996), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf(last visited Feb.
22, 2005).
231. Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,769 (1966).
232. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989) (quoting Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 771); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) (indicating that "soci-
ety's judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an indi-
vidual's personal privacy and bodily integrity").
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States Supreme Court in Breithaupt v. Abram noted that "the blood test pro-
cedure has become routine in our everyday life."
233
Another factor that bears on the intrusiveness of DNA sampling is the
information that the DNA profiles reveals. The DNA profile derived from
the blood sample establishes only a record of the individual's identity.234
Once an individual has been lawfully arrested and brought into state cus-
tody, the individual's identity becomes a matter of state interest, and he or
she has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying informa-
tion derived from the sample. 35 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit explained in Jones v. Murray that an individual who is law-
fully arrested upon probable cause has no privacy interest in his or her iden-
tifying information, even if derived from a blood sample. 36 In Jones, the
court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute requiring
all convicted felons to submit blood samples for DNA analysis and inclu-
sion in a databank for future law enforcement purposes. 237 In reaching that
conclusion, the court determined that there is no "Fourth Amendment re-
quirement of probable cause, or even a lesser degree of individualized sus-
picion, when government officials conduct a limited search [of one's DNA]
for the purpose of ascertaining and recording the identity of a person" who
is lawfully in the custody of the state.2 38 The following excerpt illustrates
the court's reasoning:
When a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification be-
comes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim pri-
vacy in it. We accept this proposition because the identification of sus-
pects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is
arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past
233. 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) (finding that where defendant was involved in a collision
killing three people, a subsequent test of defendant's blood alcohol content while defendant
lay unconscious in an emergency room was not an unreasonable search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment).
234. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the
DNA profile derived from a defendant's blood sample establishes only a record of the defen-
dant's identity and as a result, anyone "lawfully arrested and booked into state custody" can
claim no right to privacy in the sample).
235. Id.
236. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 977 (1992). "With the person's
loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy
otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 306.
237. Id. at 307.
238. Id. Note that while the Jones court was addressing the issue as applied to convicted
felons, the court emphasizes that this analysis applies to anyone who is lawfully brought into
the custody of the state upon probable cause. Id. at 306; see also Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d
1556, 1558-59 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that while obtaining DNA information requires draw-
ing blood as opposed to "inking and rolling a person's fingertips," that difference does not
render the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests more than minimal).
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and future crimes. This becomes readily apparent when we consider the
universal approbation of "booking" procedures that are followed for
every suspect arrested for a felony, whether or not the proof of a particu-
lar suspect's crime will involve the use of fingerprint identification.
Thus a tax evader is fingerprinted just the same as is a burglar. While we
do not accept even this small level of intrusion for free persons without
Fourth Amendment constraint... the same protections do not hold true
for those lawfully confined to the custody of the state.23
9
After balancing the minimal intrusion occasioned by the blood sam-
pling against the government's interest in making a permanent record of the
identities of its convicted felons, the Jones court held that DNA sampling
was a reasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.24 °
Applying similar reasoning, the court in Smith v. State241 held that the
comparison of a DNA profile with DNA evidence collected from crime
scenes does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the individual from
whom the profile is collected has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
profile once it is lawfully within the state's custody.242 In Smith, the defen-
dant's DNA profile had been obtained as a result of a state statute requiring
convicted offenders to submit to compulsory blood testing.243 When the
defendant argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the
state compared his DNA profile to the other profiles in the state DNA data-
base, the court explained that "once DNA is used to create a profile, the
profile becomes the property of the Crime Lab. 244 Expounding on this no-
tion, the court emphasized that while the defendant might have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his or her blood at the time the sample is collected,
once the sample becomes the property of the state crime lab, he or she no
longer can claim a possessory or ownership interest in the DNA profile. 245
According to the Smith court, this is so because "society [does not] recog-
nize an expectation of privacy in records made for public purposes from
legitimately obtained samples. 246 Ultimately, the court in Smith concluded
that the "reuse" of DNA profiles for purposes of comparison does not con-
239. id. at 306.
240. Id. at 306-07.
241. 744 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 2001).
242. Id. at 439
243. Id. Note that the defendant also challenged inclusion of his profile in the state data-
base because he was acquitted in the trial for which the sample was originally offered. Id. at
440-41. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, declined to adopt a rule excluding the use of
the DNA profile "in the absence of a clear directive from the legislature on the need to ex-
clude this evidence and in view of the very substantial law enforcement benefits from the
database." Id. at 442.
244. Id. at 439.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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stitute a search under the Indiana Constitution.247 The court reached its hold-
ing by likening DNA profiles to traditional fingerprints: "As the Court of
Appeals noted under the Indiana Constitution, this Court has 'recognized
that law enforcement agencies are permitted to retain and reuse fingerprint
records as well as other records of arrested parties.' We agree that this is"ls,,248
equally true for DNA profiles. Under the reasoning of Smith, it seems
DNA profiles lawfully obtained in the course of an earlier investigation are
freely available to the police in the course of new and unrelated investiga-
tions.249
It is important to remember that the Jones and Smith courts were con-
struing statutes that mandated compulsory DNA sampling on individuals
who had been convicted of a crime. 250 No court has addressed the constitu-
tionality of DNA sampling of individuals merely arrested and charged with
a crime. At least one court has intimated, however, that only individuals
actually convicted of a crime lose their interest in their DNA pro-
file." United States v. Kincade held that the DNA Act of 2000 does not
violate the Fourth Amendment in so far as it mandates compulsory DNA
sampling on federal paroles. 52 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit's plurality opinion balanced the government's interest in
CODIS against the convicted offenders' diminished expectations of pri-
253vacy. Judge Reinhardt's dissent recognized that the plurality's reasoning
supports an inference that it would be constitutional to submit arrestees to
compulsory DNA sampling because arrestees, like convicted offenders,
have a reduced expectation of privacy.254 Moreover, the dissent highlights
247. Smith, 744 N.E.2d at 440.
248. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).
249. Id.; see also Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
"DNA results are like fingerprints which are maintained on file by law enforcement authori-
ties for use in further investigations"); People v. King, 232 A.D.2d 111, 117-118 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997) (holding that once a blood sample has been lawfully obtained, it is not necessary
to show probable cause for each subsequent use of that sample because "once a person's
blood has been obtained lawfully, he can no longer assert either privacy claims or unreason-
able search and seizure arguments with respect to the use of that sample.").
250. Id.
251. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 839 ("In light of conditional releasees' substantially diminished expectations
of privacy, the minimal intrusion occasioned by blood sampling, and the overwhelming
societal interests so clearly furthered by the collection of DNA information from convicted
offenders, we must conclude that compulsory DNA profiling of qualified federal offenders is
Tvasmab undet the wttality of the eirmstazes?').
254. Id. at 864 ("The Court has identified countless groups of individuals who have re-
duced expectations of privacy. . . . Arrestees' privacy expectations, too, appear to be signifi-
cantly reduced.... Under the analysis engaged in by the plurality, a totality of the circum-
stances test would apply to any suspicionless search regime involving these groups.").
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the fact that many other individuals experience a reduced expectation of
privacy at some point in their life and as a result, under the plurality's rea-
soning, most Americans are susceptible to having their DNA sampled.255
For example, Reinhardt's dissent notes that students, drivers, and airline
passengers all maintain reduced expectations of privacy.256 In response to
the attack on its opinion, the plurality stressed the limited nature of its hold-
ing:
Judge Reinhardt's dissent repeatedly asserts that our decision renders
every person in America subject to DNA sampling for CODIS purposes
.... Nothing could be further from the truth-and we respectfully sug-
gest that our dissenting colleague ought to recognize the obvious and
significant distinction between the DNA profiling of law-abiding citi-
zens who are passing through some transient status (e.g., newborns, stu-
dents, passengers in a car or on a plane) and lawfully adjudicated crimi-
nals whose proven conduct substantially heightens the government's in-
terest- in monitoring them and quite properly carries lasting conse-
quences that simply do not attach from the simple fact of having been
born, or going to public school, or riding in a car.
2 5 7
Ultimately, the plurality's opinion in Kincade seems to suggest that
compulsory DNA sampling may not be constitutionally imposed on arrest-
ees.2 58 The plurality clearly makes the distinction between a convicted of-
fender's privacy interest that has been diminished versus a transient passen-
ger in a car or airport whose privacy expectation is diminished.25 9 Yet, the
plurality never quite concludes that arrestees maintain a reduced privacy
expectation distinguishable from a convicted offender.
260
Ultimately, arrestees experience a significant reduction in privacy, and
as a result, law enforcement may lawfully make a record of their identifying
information.26 ' Whether or not the identifying information may exist in the
form of a DNA sample has yet to be addressed by the courts. Although Kin-
cade suggests that arrestees' privacy interests are not reduced to the degree
which would allow for compulsory DNA sampling, the court did not say as
much in its holding.262
255. Id. ("If reduced expectations of privacy render inapplicable the requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion, then suspicionless searches would be valid in many more situations
than the plurality would presently be willing to admit.").
256. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 864.
257. Id. at 835-36.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 977 (1992).
262. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836-37.
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III. ANALYSIS
Given the framework provided in the previous section, this note now
applies traditional Fourth Amendment principles to Justice for All Act of
2004.The following section begins with an application of Fourth Amend-
ment search law to the provisions of the recently amended DNA Act of
1994 and 2000 which authorize DNA sampling. Next, this section considers
the rights implicated when the government subjects arrestees to DNA sam-
pling pursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004.
A. Federal Law Authorizes a Search
Applying the reasoning of Schmerber, it is clear that compulsory sam-
pling of blood for DNA profiling pursuant to the DNA Act of 2000 is a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes.263 The very nature of the intrusion
invades the body and infringes the bodily integrity that the Fourth Amend-
ment is designed to protect. 264 As a result, the government's policy that ar-
restees changed with a crime submit to compulsory extraction of blood
samples unquestionably calls for a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. It is important to remember that while the current policy
among many states and the federal government is to generate DNA profiles
from blood samples, the text of the federal law does not require it.265 In-
stead, the law merely permits blood sampling.266 As a result, it cannot be
said that federal law mandates a search, but only sanctions one.
If states decide to submit individuals arrested and charged with a crime
to DNA sampling pursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004, federal law
allows'them the flexibility to determine which DNA collection techniques
to employ. 267 Given the vast array of DNA collection techniques avail-
able,268 it is possible that not all states will model their procedures after the
federal rule. Some states may choose to collect DNA in the form of saliva,
skin cells, or even hair, and in fact, they do.269 Applying the reasoning of In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills) and United States v. Dionisio, it is argu-
able that no search would result from the state collecting a skin or hair sam-
ple.270 As a result, it would be completely in compliance with the Fourth
263. See generally discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
264. Id.
265. See generally discussion supra Part L.A.
266. Id.
267. See generally discussion supra Part I.A.3.
268. See Victor Walter Weedn and John W. Hicks, supra note 112.
269. Division of Governmental Studies and Services Washington State University and
Smith Ailing Lane, P.S, supra note 27, at 40.
270. For a discussion of Mills and Dionisio see supra Part I(B)(1)(b).
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Amendment to obtain a DNA sample in the form of hair, expectorate, or
epidermal cells from not just convicted offenders, but also from arrestees. A
further consideration of the nature of the information derived from a DNA
sample only supports this conclusion. The following section discusses the
privacy interest one holds in the identifying features of his or her DNA pro-
file.
Under Katz, the question of whether generating a DNA profile is a
search hinges on whether society does or should recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the 13 STR loci used by the CODIS system. The
Court has held that one does not maintain a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in one's identifying features, 271 and because the DNA profile used for
CODIS contains only identifying features, it appears that an individual who
has been arrested and charged with a crime does not have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile. Note that under this analysis,
it appears that no one, including free members of society, has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her or her STR profile.272 Whether or not this
analysis should extend to free citizens is beyond the scope of this note.
Furthermore, the security protocols the FBI has in place only empha-
size that the government has no intention of using-and will not tolerate
others using-the DNA sample as a means of revealing private medical
information about the suspect.273 Ultimately, under current Fourth Amend-
ment principles, no privacy interests are implicated through the creation of a
CODIS DNA profile.
It is important to remember, however, that most jurisdictions obtain a
blood or buccal swab sample in order to generate that profile. As a result,
the following section will assess the reasonableness of the searches that
result from such intrusions.
B. Federal Law Authorizes a Reasonable Search
There is no question that the benefits of collecting DNA from indi-
viduals arrested and charged with a crime aids in the prosecution of crimes,
exoneration of the innocent, and possibly the deterrence of crimes.274 While
271. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
272. For a discussion of the policy concerns and interests implicated when the govern-
ment uses nonintrusive means to collect DNA samples for identification purposes see Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH.
L. REv. 413, 437-40 (2001).
273. See infra discussion on FBI quality assurance and control Part IV(B).
274. See, e.g, Gaines v. State 998 P.2d 166, 171-73 (Nev. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S.
856 (2000) (emphasizing that courts have uniformly held that "the government interest out-
weighs a convict's diminished right for privacy in his genetic markers because such informa-
tion provides law enforcement with a dramatic new tool that can be used to accurately iden-
tify a criminal suspect attempting to conceal his identity.").
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there are legitimate privacy interests at stake in the intrusions occasioned by
blood or buccal swab sampling, they are simply outweighed by the govern-
ment's interest in CODIS. The law clearly establishes controls and safe-
guards to protect the genetic information contained in a DNA sample. 275 As
a result, any threat to genetic privacy is minimal. On the scale that balances
the government's interest in CODIS versus the arrestee's interest in his
DNA profile, the government wins.
To reach this result, however, this analysis has employed the tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness. This test balances the gov-
ernment's interest in solving and preventing crimes against the arrestee's
privacy interest. Given an arrestee's diminished expectation of privacy, it is
likely that the government will always win this balancing test, no matter the
degree of intrusion. An arrestee's privacy interests simply cannot compete
with interests in solving crime, preventing recidivism, exonerating the inno-
cent, and convicting the guilty. The notion that the government's interest
will nearly always tip the scales indicates that the traditional Fourth
Amendment test of reasonableness is flawed. The following section argues
for additional considerations that should bear on the reasonableness of sub-
mitting arrestees to DNA sampling pursuant to the Justice for All Act of
2004.
IV. PROPOSAL
The Fourth Amendment balancing test employed by courts like Kin-
cade is flawed in that it is fails to consider whether it is reasonable to use a
CODIS hit as a law enforcement investigation tool. The FBI argues that the
primary goal of the database is to generate hits that will lead law enforce-
ment officers to an identifiable suspect.27 6 In assessing the government's
interest in such a program, courts have simply taken the FBI's argument at
face value.27 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kincade, for example,
did not consider what security measures and efficiency standards are in
place to assure that the database produces accurate "hits." Moreover, the
275. See infra discussion on FBI quality assurance and control Part IV(B).
276. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The FBI's Combined DNA Index System, Mission
Statement and Background, supra note 6.
277. Numerous federal district and circuit courts, and a variety of state courts have ad-
dressed the Fourth Amendment concerns inherent in the compulsory DNA profiling of con-
victed offenders, but none have considered whether using a CODIS hit as a reliable source
for criminal investigation is reasonable in light of Fourth Amendment protections. See, e.g.,
Groceman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cit. 2W)4); Velasquez
v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th
Cir. 1992); Nicholas v. Goord, 2004 WL 1432533, *2-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Jun 24, 2004); United
States v. Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548-50 (D. Md. 2003); Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F.
Supp. 2d 1338, 1343-44 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
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court failed to consider the potential for error, fraud, and mishandling of
DNA samples that ultimately form the basis for a CODIS match. Whether
the CODIS system operates under quality control standards that minimize
the potential for needless prosecutions should bear on the Fourth Amend-
ment test of reasonableness. After all, if the goal of the CODIS database is
to serve as law enforcement's greatest investigation too, the FBI should
make clear that its hits will not lead to unwarranted investigations of inno-
cent persons. The following discussion offers additional considerations that
should bear on the reasonableness of collecting DNA from arrestees pursu-
ant to the Justice for All Act of 2004.
A. Fallibility of DNA Testing
Despite what is often portrayed in both the media and the courtroom,
DNA testing is not infallible.278 While it can be highly accurate when done
correctly, the notion that DNA testing is error-free is wrong in both princi-
ple and practice. 279 There is always a possibility that a declared DNA match
may be erroneous due to the sample quality, flaws in the testing process, or
human error introduced during interpretation by an analyst.280 The following
sections offer instances in which human intervention can undermine the
reliability of hits generated from the CODIS database.
1. Collection and Storage of DNA sample
A number of problems can occur in the collection, handling, and stor-
age of DNA samples, resulting in an increased rate of error.28 DNA sam-
ples can be contaminated, either before or after collection, if they are not
28
stored under proper conditions. 82 For example, if trace amounts of DNA
278. See, e.g., Jill Lawless, THE Assoc. PRESS, DNA Fingerprinting Sparks Fresh Wor-
ries: Discoverer Says Genetic Databases Could be Misused (Sept. 8, 2004) at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5944270/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (founder of DNA fin-
gerprinting reveals that "DNA testing is not an infallible proof of identity").
279. The Age, DNA Testing and Human Error (Dec. 1I, 2003) at
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/12/10/1070732280097.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2005); see also Nat'l Research Council, Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update,
The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence 80 (1996), at
http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/DNA/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
280. Id.
281. Jennifer Sue Deck, Prelude to a Miss: A Cautionary Note Against Expanding DNA
Databanks in the Face ofScientific Uncertainty, 20 VT. L. REV. 1057, 1090 (Summer 1996).
282. Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment: DNA Identification Tests and the
Courts, 63 WASH. L. REv. 903, 919-21 (1998). A DNA sample can be contaminated by a
variety of products, from carpet cleaner at a crime scene to the lab technician's perspiration
at the commercial lab. William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and
Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 66-67 (1989); see also
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from an outside source come into contact with another DNA sample, the
ensuing analysis can be complicated or even inaccurate.28 3 As a result, error
rates are high in situations where DNA profiles are created from samples
that are mixed or partially degraded.284
Errors can also occur in the collection and handling of a DNA sam-
ple.285 DNA samples can be damaged from the police directly or indirectly
destroying DNA evidence or altering the evidence such that it can no longer
be accurately examined.28 6 In addition, the laboratory that examines the
DNA profile might mischaracterize the DNA sample or the crime scene
evidence sample.287 Several instances exist in which laboratory personnel
actually switched or mislabeled DNA samples, which resulted in needless
persecution of innocent individuals.288 Even a small potential for error can
be significant in cases where there is little or no other evidence against a
suspect, as in cases relying on CODIS hits.
J.I. Thornton, DNA Profiling: New Tool Links Evidence to Suspects With High Certainty,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 20, 1989, at 30 (stating that DNA is very fragile and
is easily contaminated).
283. Id. at 920.
284. Id.
285. See generally Ryan MacDonald, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the Weak Links
in the DNA Chain, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 345, 357-59 (1998) (emphasizing the need for law
enforcement to observe "chain of custody" standards to preserve the integrity of a DNA
sample.)
286. Cronan, supra note 200, at 139; see also William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in
the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827 (1996) (detailing the laundry list of errors
that occurred in the handling of biological evidence obtained from MT. Simpson and the
crime scene).
287. The following excerpt illustrates the potential for a mismatch during the handling
process:"Suppose that in creating the databank, Jones's DNA was switched with Smith's,
and Jones is the true source of the evidence sample. The database search then will falsely
incriminate Smith." D.H. Kaye, Genetics in the Courtroom: Bioethical Objections to DNA
Databases for Law Enforcement: Questions and Answers, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 936, 940
(2001).
288. See, e.g., Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, New DNA Test Casts Doubt on Man's
1999 Rape Conviction, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 10, 2003, at
http://www.truthinjustice.org/sutton.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); Innocence Project,
Timothy Durham, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=43 (last
visited Nov. 2, 2004). In 1993 Timothy Durham was convicted of multiple charges including
first-degree rape, forcible sodomy, and attempted robbery. Id. Despite the testimony of
eleven witnesses who placed Durham at a skeet shooting competition in Dallas at the time of
the rape, the prosecution was successful in convincing the jury of Durham's guilt using DNA
evidence that matched semen recovered from the victim. Id. Four years later, it was discov-
ered that DNA samples had been mixed together in the lab. Id. Subsequent DNA testing
proved Durham's innocence. Id.
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2. Interpretation of Results
The potential for error in DNA testing can be increased by the context
in which lab technicians perform their analysis. 289 Laboratory reviews indi-
cate that some DNA analysts do not exactly blind themselves to the prose-
cution's expected or desired outcome. 290 Evidence shows that when lab ana-
lysts work closely with law enforcement, some lab analysts demonstrate
tendencies to falsify evidence or misrepresent results. 29 1 Failure to correctly
report results of DNA analyses and reporting misleading or inaccurate sta-
tistical information has resulted in the conviction of innocent people.292
Several cases exist in which lab analysts have greatly exaggerated the
statistical significance of their findings or reported matches when none was
found.293 In 2003 Houston's crime lab was shut down after an independent
investigation revealed widespread problems associated with the handling
and analysis of DNA evidence. 294 As a result of the shut down, thousands of
cases are scheduled for review and 375 for re-testing.295 While the problems
uncovered in these labs are thought to be the exception rather than the rule,
these cases emphasize the fallibility and limitations inherent in DNA testing
and the need for careful scrutiny, particularly in cases that hinge on DNA
evidence alone.296
289. MacDonald, supra note 286 at 355-59.
290. See, e.g., Timothy W. Maier, Inside the DNA Labs, Insight on the News (May 26,
2003), at http://www.insightmag.com/news/2003/06/1 0/National/Inside.The.Dna.Labs-
436794.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (offering the story of former FBI lab technician
Jacquelyn Blake who admitted she failed to follow required scientific procedures while ana-
lyzing 103 DNA samples during the last few years).
291. For example, Anthony Bragdon spent ten years in prison for a rape he did not com-
mit because FBI Crime Lab analyst Michael Malone gave inaccurate testimony and withheld
evidence. John Soloman, Conviction Tossed on FBI Lab Misconduct, A.P. News, at
http://www.truthinjustice.org/FBI-lab-misconduct.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
292. See generally Innocence Project, at innocenceproject.org.
293. See, e.g., Hot Topic: HPD Crime Lab, HOUSTON CHRON., (Nov. 8, 2004), at
http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/03/crimelab/ (Feb. 28, 2005) (offering an
archive of all the reports of fraudulent activity that has been reported about the Harris County
crime lab); Steve Mills and Maurice Possley, Report Alleges Crime Lab Fraud: Scientist is
Accused of Providing False Testimony, CHICAGO TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2001) at http://www.law-
forensic.com/cfr fish 5.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
294. HPD Crime Lab, supra note 294.
295. S eve M-V/itkeT, Moy DPS Labs Flwed- D"NA Tting Woes kvrlass Stt
Threaten Thousands of Cases, Houston Chron., (Mar. 27, 2004), at
http://www.truthinjustice.org/labs-flawed.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
296. See generally Frederic Whitehurst, Forensic Crime Labs: Scrutinizing Results,
Audits & Accreditation-Part 1, 28 Champion 6, 6 (Apr. 2004) (discussing the devastating
effects of'forensic failures").
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3. Duplicate DNA Matches
Another potential threat to persecution of innocent individuals is that
current DNA testing methods allow for the possibility, however slight, that
two people can have matching genetic fingerprints. 297 As the CODIS data-
base expands, this possibility becomes more and more likely due to the sta-
tistical probabilities for a match. 98
4. Manipulation of DNA Evidence
Courts assessing the reasonableness of using CODIS as a tool for
criminal investigation must at least recognize the "craftiness and adaptabil-
ity of the criminal mind, which already is trying to outsmart forensic DNA
technologies.' 299 Given the increase in public awareness about the advances
in DNA technology, criminals are educating themselves on the various ways
DNA evidence may be used and abused.300 Clever criminals have managed
to manipulate DNA evidence to mask their identity. 301 Reports indicate that
criminals are taking unusual steps to ensure that they leave no biological
evidence at the scene of a crime-or that they leave someone else's. 30 2 For
example, law enforcement authorities in Waco, Texas reported that a sus-
pected rapist was caught "decked out in mask and gloves and carrying a
condom. 30 3 Only 100 miles down the road, Austin authorities apprehended
a suspected burglar who, at the time of arrest, was "wearing protective shoe
covers and two pairs of gloves-just like a lab technician. ' '304 One of the
most impressive-or disturbing--demonstrations of criminal cunning oc-
cuffed when an inmate, in an attempt to undermine the DNA evidence used
297. Lawless, supra note 280 (recounting the statement from Alex Jeffreys, founder of
the genetic fingerprint, that the probability of two individuals having matching genetic se-
quences is "between one in a billion or one in a trillion").
298. Id.ln his interview, Mr. Jeffereys comments that the probability that two individuals
would share the same DNA sequence "sounds very good indeed until you start thinking
about large DNA databases." Id. According to Mr. Jeffreys, "In a database of 2.5 million
people, a one-in-a-billion probability becomes a one-in-400 chance of at least one match." Id.
299. Rosen, supra note 15.
300. Richard Willing, Criminals Try to Outwit DNA, USA Today, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al.
In his article, Willing reports that detention officers in Utah "have overheard prisoners
coaching each other on how to spread blood and semen samples from other people around
crime scenes to try to fool DNA analysts."
301. Rosen, supra note 15. In her article, Rosen reports that "law enforcement officers in
Richmond have found prisoners taking DNA tests for other prisoners."
302. Willing, supra note 301.
303. Id. Willing also reports that "rape victims in California, Michigan and
New York have reported incidents in which their assailants forced them to clean and bathe to
try to scrub away any DNA evidence." Id.
304. Id.
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in his rape conviction, had a relative smuggle his semen sample out of the
jail in a ketchup packet, and then paid a woman fifty dollars to use the
sperm to stage a phony rape." 30 5 Apparently, the clever crook manipulated
the DNA evidence to convince law enforcement that the real rapist was still
at large.30 6
B. Quality Assurance Standards
Given the potential for error, fraud, and corruption, whether it is rea-
sonable to employ the CODIS database to generate investigative leads de-
pends on whether the FBI has sufficient quality assurance standards in place
to protect the integrity of the DNA samples it collects and profiles.
To guard against the possibility of unreasonable error in the CODIS
database, the FBI established standards that all participating state crime labs
must follow to "ensure the quality and integrity of the data and competency
of the laboratory. 30 7 Furthermore, an FBI advisory board exists to ensure
and, if appropriate, periodically revise the recommended standards for qual-
ity assurance. 308 It is important to remember that the DNA Act of 1994 pro-
vides that access to the CODIS database is subject to cancellation if the
FBI's quality control requirements are not met by participating forensic
laboratories.3 °9
To protect the integrity of the DNA analysis process, the FBI's quality
assurance standards specifically address contamination. 310 The standards
require that a state forensic laboratory participating in the CODIS "shall
have a facility that is designed to provide adequate security and minimize
contamination. 3 1' To protect the quality of the DNA sample, the FBI re-
105. Id.
306. Id.
307. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Quality Assurance Standards for Convicted Offender
DNA Databasing Laboratories, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congressO2/datastd.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2005). The quality assurance standards for forensic DNA testing laboratories
address the following topics: organization and management, personnel, facilities, evidence
control, validation, analytical procedures, equipment calibration and maintenance, reports,
review, proficiency testing, corrective action, audits, safety, and use of subcontractor labora-
tories. Id.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 14131(a) (1994),
309. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c) (2004).
310. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Testimony of Dwight E. Adams, Deputy Assistant
Director, Laboratory Division, FBI Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Governuent Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations, The FBI's DNA Program, (June 12, 2001) at
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/dwight061201.htm (citing Quality Assurance Stan-
dards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories, Standard 6.1).
311. Id. (citing Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories,
Standard 6.1.4).
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quires the laboratories to "have a procedure requiring that evidence sam-
ple/extract(s) are stored in a manner that minimizes degradation., 31 2 To
prevent DNA samples from loss or misidentification, the FBI guidelines
require forensic laboratories to keep specific documentation with respect to
the identification of the sample and chain of custody.1 3 Finally, to keep the
DNA analysts on their toes, the FBI provides for external proficiency tests
to be performed at regular intervals. 3t4 "Compliance with both the quality
assurance standards and the external proficiency testing program are moni-
tored by annual[,]" external audits every year.315
Not only does the FBI monitor the collection and analysis of DNA
samples, but also individual states take an active role in monitoring the sys-
tem of DNA collection. 316 The majority of states have quality assurance
standards of their own in place to regulate the handling and use of DNA
profiles to be used for the CODIS.317
If doubts remain about the accuracy of DNA matches created using the
CODIS, it is important to remember that evidence of DNA match may al-
ways be challenged as inadmissible at trial based on the mishandling, chain
of custody, or quality of the procedures employed to perform the testing. t
In the alterative, a suspect whose DNA has been matched to DNA collected
from a crime scene can merely provide a new DNA sample if he believes
312. Id. (citing Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories,
Standard 7.2.1.).
313. A complete list of the Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing
Laboratories is at http://www.cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/dabqas.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). Standard 7, Evidence Control,provides for the following:
7.1 The laboratory shall have and follow a documented sample inventory control
system. This system shall ensure that:
7.1.1 Offender samples are marked for identification.
7.1.2 Documentation of sample identity, collection, receipt, storage, and disposi-
tion is maintained.
7.1.3 The laboratory follows documented procedures that minimize sample loss,
contamination, and/or deleterious change.
7.1.4 The laboratory has secure areas for sample storage including environ-
mental control consistent with the form or nature of the sample.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (2004).
315. Id. at §14132(b)(2)(B) (2004).
316. See S. Axelrad, State Regulations on Quality Assurance for Forensic DNA Labora-
tories, 2004 Am. Soc'y Law, Medicine & Ethics, at
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/reports/axelrad2.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
317. The American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics produced a report that surveys
every state's DNA database statutes, including the statutes that address issues of misuse,
mishandling, and retention of DNA samples. DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties-
Project Homepage, (Sept. 2004), Am. Soc'y of Law, Medicine & Ethics, at
http://www.aslme.org/dna 04/grd/statute_grid.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
318. See, e.g., Fugate v. Com., 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1999).
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that the match is erroneous.3 1 9 In his article, Genetics in the Courtroom,
Professor D.H. Kaye discusses a solution in the event a CODIS match arises
because either the databank sample or the trace evidence sample has been
mischaracterized:
Suppose that in creating the databank, Jones's DNA was switched with
Smith's, and Jones is the true source of the evidence sample. The data-
base search then will falsely incriminate Smith. But the database search
should be the beginning, not the end of the investigation. Even in the
unlikely event that the police have no other evidence against Smith, a
confirmatory DNA test of a new sample taken from Smith will exclude
him as a possible source of the evidence sample.32°
One should note, however, that because the current practice among law
enforcement communities around the country is to corroborate a positive
DNA match with other evidence before proceeding with prosecution, it
might very well be unnecessary to challenge the DNA match.
321
V. CONCLUSION
This note attempts to bring to the forefront additional considerations
that should bear on the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness when the
government submits arrestees to DNA sampling pursuant to the Justice for
All Act of 2004. This note concludes that whether it is a reasonable search
to collect DNA from individuals arrested and charged with a crime should
depend, in no small part, on whether it is reasonable to employ CODIS as
an investigative tool. The traditional Fourth Amendment test of reasonable-
ness as applied to the DNA Acts of 1994 and 2000 balances the arrestee's
privacy interest against the government's interest in crime fighting. Whether
the government's interest can actually be accomplished through a compre-
hensive DNA database, however, has yet to be considered as an additional
factor bearing on the reasonableness of conducting a search of one's DNA.
This note proposes that because the DNA samples are collected for the pur-
pose of uploading into the CODIS database, one should question whether or
not it is reasonable to use CODIS as a law enforcement tool.
Given the potential for error, fraud, and corruption in DNA analysis, is
it reasonable for the government to rely on CODIS hits as an aid to criminal
investigations? Absolutely. CODIS does not purport to be perfect, but then
again, neither does the criminal justice system. The very standard of guilt in
a criminal prosecution is "beyond a reasonable doubt." The potential for
319. Kaye, supra note 288.
320. Id.
321. Elissa Gaynor, A Modem Day Crime-Fighting Tool: DNA Testing, Knowledge
Gene J., at http://www.knowledgene.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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error and fraud inherent in the CODIS, like any other system, is acceptable
so long as that potential is not unreasonable. A criminal justice system that
employs DNA as a forensic tool is most certainly justified in using "hits"
from CODIS in a criminal investigation, notwithstanding the potential for
error and fraud, because stringent uniform quality control procedures and
regulations exist to prevent wrongful convictions.
The CODIS database has the potential to drastically change the way
law enforcement investigates crime. It has proven to be an effective crime-
solver, and with time, there is no doubt that it will become an effective
crime-fighter. Its success, however, is only as large as its database, and the
future of CODIS hinges on the government's ability to constitutionally ex-
act DNA from certain individuals. The constitutionality of expanding the
scope of the CODIS database to include DNA from arrestees will remain
unsolved in the absence of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court.3221t is
quite possible, however, that after considering all of the interests at stake,
the Justice for All Act of 2004 will be upheld.
Simply because a law is constitutional, however, does not necessarily
mean that it reflects sound public policy. Apart from whether the acquisition
of DNA is constitutional, one cannot deny the threat to individual privacy
imposed by a government-controlled database of genetic information. Indi-
viduals submitting DNA samples must have guarantees of privacy protec-
tion, such as how the information will be used, who will have access to it,
how it will be disseminated, and if and when it will be expunged from the
database. Although current federal law addresses all of these issues, the
courts will have to continue to modify the Fourth Amendment balancing test
as new developments in DNA technology emerge.
Kimberly A. Polanco*
322. Note that because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004), has been appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, it is possible that a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of DNA sampling will be
made in the near future. See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-7253.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2005) (indicating that the Ninth Circuit's decision has been issued a Supreme
Court docket number and briefs from the petitioner and respondent have been filed).
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